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the authors introduce a stylized version of a competitive game in which high fre-
quency traders (HFTs) interact with each other and liquidity traders. The authors
then show that risk aversion plays an important role in the transition from sure
to mixed (or probabilistic) sniping. In this paper, we re-interpret and extend these
conclusions in the context of repeated games and highlight some differences in
results. In particular, we identify situations in which probabilistic sniping is gen-
uinely profitable that are qualitatively different from the ones obtained in [16].
It turns out that beyond a specific risk aversion threshold the game resembles
the well-known prisoner’s dilemma, in that probabilistic sniping becomes a way to
cooperate among the HFTs that leaves all the participants better off. In order to
turn this into a viable strategy for the repeated game, we show how compliance
can be monitored through the use of sequential statistical testing.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The burgeoning of algorithmic and high-frequency trading on modern financial
exchanges has give rise to theoretical investigations scrutinizing the mechanisms
that underpin these markets. To analyse this complexity of continuous-time trad-
ing, a number of authors (e.g. [2,16]) have proposed stylized models of the stock
market. Although these stylized models can not capture all the intricacies of the
markets in detail, they are nonetheless very useful as they often hint at interesting
behaviour. As a case in point, Menkveld and Zoican [16] designed a simple model
(referred to as the MZ game from here on) to study the impact of exchange la-
tency on liquidity. They show that faster exchanges reduce payoff risk and spread,
but also give rise to speculative behaviours among high frequency traders (HFT).
More specifically, they envisage a situation in which a group of competing
but comparably equipped HFTs is operating alongside a large crowd of traditional
liquidity traders (LT). A market is created by selecting a single market maker (MM)
from among the HFTs. This market maker then publishes an ask-bid quote for a
single financial asset on the exchange, and stands to earn the spread when this
quote is hit by a liquidity trader. However, what makes this game interesting is that
fresh news items, published at random times, push the intrinsic value of the asset
either up or down. The ensuing jump in value causes all the HFTs to race to the
exchange, albeit it with different intentions. The market maker attempts to cancel
his own now stale quotes1, while the other HFTs (dubbed bandits hereafter) race
to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity created by the outdated quotes.
This type of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the bandits, is called sniping.
The authors in [16] conclude (among other things) that increasing risk aversion
in the market induces a qualitative transition in the sniping behaviour of HFTs.
While these results are intriguing and highly non-trivial, they hinge on some
subtle but important features of the game. In particular, the authors study this
problem in the context of a single-shot game, and focus on Nash equilibria as their
main solution concept. In this paper we espouse an alternative view by interpreting
the market activities of the HFTs as a repeated game with an infinite horizon. In
this alternative setting a player can adopt more far-sighted strategies that attempt
to maximise long-term gains. This change of viewpoint has a number of important
consequences:
– It identifies situations in which probabilistic sniping is genuinely profitable and
therefore extends the conclusions in [16] by introducing qualitatively different
solutions. More specifically, it shows that forms of informal collaboration in
which bandits voluntary decrease their sniping frequency, results in better utility
for everyone. This explains why bandits are willing to engage in probabilistic
sniping, for which there seems to be no compelling reason in the original MZ
model.
1 A quote for an asset is stale when it no longer reflects the most recent information.
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– It allows us to identify two thresholds (for risk aversion) that govern the tran-
sitions between the three different sniping regimes: from sure sniping to prob-
abilistic sniping to no sniping.
– Finally, we identify a way for an individual HFT to monitor the behaviour of
the other HFts in order to detect non-compliance. This detection mechanism
is necessary to deter devious HFTs from exploiting trustworthy colleagues by
sniping more than is optimal.
1.2 Overview and contributions of this paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
– In section 2 we introduce the MZ-game, and show how one can compute the
utility of each possible outcome. Combining these outcomes with the prob-
abilities of the corresponding events yields the expected utility for both the
market maker and any one of the bandits. It turns out that both these utilities
are linear functions of the spread s. The intersection of these two utility lines
determines a point of indifference (s∗, u∗) (see Fig. 2) that predicts the be-
haviour of the agents. More precisely, since at the start of the MZ game, HFTs
are still unsure about their role in the game (market maker or bandit) they will
advertise a spread s that makes them indifferent (in terms of expected utility)
to the outcome of this selection. The point of indifference (s∗, u∗) is therefore
a focal point and constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game whenever u∗ > 0.
However, this is no longer the case when u∗ ≤ 0 and this is where probabilistic
sniping becomes relevant. .
– Section 3 takes a detailed look at the concept of probabilistic sniping: rather
than attempting to snipe at every possible opportunity (sure sniping), bandits
voluntarily restrain themselves and only enter the sniping race with a probability
p < 1. Less sniping is obviously beneficial for the market maker but, under
certain circumstances, this also protects bandits from adverse effects. As a
consequence, depending on the choice of the sniping probability p, the point
of indifference shifts to a (potentially) more favourable position (s∗(p), u∗(p))
(see Fig. 3). In this section we characterize in detail how utilities (and derived
quantities such as the point of indifference) depend on the sniping probability.
– Whether or not probabilistic sniping results in better utility (for all HFTs in-
volved) depends ultimately on the game parameters (see Fig. 4): changing
these parameters might induce a transition in optimal behaviour, e.g. from
sure sniping to probabilistic sniping. In section 4 we show how a simple ge-
ometric argument allows us to characterise the conditions under which two
transitions between the different types of sniping occur: viz. from sure snip-
ing to probabilistic sniping to no sniping (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). We then
highlight the specific role of risk aversion γ in these sniping transitions and
identify the relevant thresholds γK and γL (section 4.3). Finally, we intro-
duce the optimal sniping probability p∗K (section 4.4) that results in the best
possible utility u∗K .
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– Up to this point in the paper, the equilibria obtained under various conditions
were optimal, but not necessarily Nash equilibria for the single-shot MZ game.
In section 5 we explain what the implications are of shifting our viewpoint
from one-shot to repeated games. In particular, we argue that probabilistic
sniping will give rise to a new set of playable subgame-perfect Nash equi-
libria. To turn this into a workable solution, we need to be able to reliably
detect non-compliance on the part of the other agents, in order to be able to
take retaliatory measures. We therefore quantify the effect that devious agents
(agents that pretend to snipe probabilistically, but in fact snipe for sure) have
on the utility of trustworthy agents (see e.g. Figs. 12 or 13). We conclude this
section by discussing how Wald’s sequential probability ratio test can be used
to reliably detect non-compliance (see Fig. 14).
– Finally, in section 6, we discuss how our work compares to related research
and finish by offering some conclusions and suggestions for further research in
section 7.
– The main part of this paper focuses on the conceptual framework that un-
derpins our results. All the computational details are therefore relegated to
sections A through J in the appendix. Since the mathematical characteri-
sation of the results often requires tedious but straightforward algebra, we
also provide Python notebooks to support all the computations. These can be
found:
KPD supplementary material link to GitHub
Contributions The main contributions in this paper can be found in sections 3
through 5, and can be summarized as follows:
1. We show how the MZ model of the stock exchange can be re-interpreted as
a repeated (sequential) game against nature. In addition, we think of the
choice of sniping probability (for the bandits) as a choice of a pure action
from a continuous action space, rather than a probabilistic mixing of two pure
strategies (i.e. sniping and non-sniping). This change of viewpoint allows us
to identify a wider set of conditions under which probabilistic sniping makes
sense (see section 3.4) . Put succinctly, although these new equilibria are not
Nash equilibria for a one-shot stage game, they are genuine subgame-perfect
equilibria in the corresponding repeated game with infinite horizon.
2. We identify two threshold values (viz. γK and γL) for the risk aversion factor
γ that govern the transition to probabilistic sniping. More specifically, when γ
increases beyond γK , probabilistic sniping becomes advantageous for all HFTs
involved. Conversely, when γ exceeds γL, even probabilistic sniping is no longer
profitable.
3. We show that under conditions for which probabilistic sniping is advantageous,
there is an optimal sniping probability p∗K that maximises expected utilities for
both the market maker and the bandits. Both the sniping probability and
the corresponding optimal utility vary continuously as functions of the game
parameters (see Fig. 9).
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4. When the game conditions call for probabilistic sniping in order to optimise
utility, the agents are tempted to snipe for sure as this maximises their own
utility to the detriment of their compliant colleagues whose utility is negatively
affected. As a consequence, agents participating in such a probabilistic sniping
regime need a strategy to detect the non-compliance of deceptive agents.
We show how this can be done using Wald’s sequential probability ratio test
(section 5.3.2).
5. Reproducible research: We provide Python notebooks that will allow the dili-
gent reader to check the straightforward but tedious calculations underpinning
our arguments, as well as simulations that illustrate the fluctuations about the
mean values that result from the theoretical approach.
2 The Menkveld-Zoican (MZ) game revisited
2.1 A bird’s eye view of the MZ game
As this paper builds on the MZ paper [16], we briefly highlight some of the main
arguments and conclusions from that paper. In [16], the authors define a stylized
version of the behaviour and strategies of high frequency traders (HFT) interacting
with an (high-frequency) exchange. We defer some details to section 2.2 but,
roughly speaking, they envisage a game in which, during an initial pre-game stage,
the HFTs have to pick the value of the (half) spread s in order to post a single
bid-ask quote (v ± s) for a financial asset of (commonly perceived) value v. One
of the HFTs is then selected as market maker, whereas the others are relegated to
the role of bandit. Only the quotes of the market maker will enter the order book,
so he is the only one who can benefit from trading with liquidity traders who visit
the exchange at random times (with rate µ). The bandits will try to gain some
payoff by attempting to snipe stale quotes (see section 2.2 for more details).
The game is initiated by a trigger event which can be either the publication
of news item (changing the intrinsic value v of the asset), or the interaction of
a liquidity trader with the market maker (resulting in income for the latter). The
latter event does not evoke any reaction from the HFTs, but the former alters the
intrinsic value of the asset and causes all the HFTs to race towards the exchange,
albeit for different reasons. The market maker attempts to cancel his now stale
quotes, whereas the bandits hope to obtain financial gain by sniping the market
maker. The outcome of this race if further complicated by the fact that, during
the race, another event (news or liquidity trade) might occur. This is less likely
when the exchange is fast (low exchange latency δ).
In [16] the authors investigate in detail how the interplay between various game
parameters affect the behaviour and strategies of the HFTs. Although this model
is highly stylized and therefore somewhat unrealistic, it is the contention of the MZ
authors that even under these simplifying assumptions, interesting and non-trivial
conclusions can be drawn. This suggests that a more realistic model will give rise
to even more intriguing insights.
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2.2 Primitives for the MZ game
Because they are important to understand the rest of the paper, we briefly reca-
pitulate the main ingredients and assumptions governing the MZ game. For more
details we refer to the original paper [16].
– Agents or Players The players in this game is the group of H > 2 high-
frequency traders (HFTs) who operate in an environment populated by an
infinite number of (uninformed) liquidity traders (LT). All HFTs have simulta-
neous and instantaneous access to all public information affecting the market.
At the start of the game, one HFT is assigned to the role of market maker. The
remaining (H − 1) HFTs take up the role of high-frequency bandits (HFB),
intent on financial gain by sniping the stale quotes whenever an opportunity
presents itself. A final important characteristic of all HFTs is that they are
risk-averse, i.e. the utility of negative pay-offs is inflated by a factor γ > 1.
– Exchange latency δ measures the time delay δ between the trigger event
(that sets off the game) and the arrival of one HFT at the matching engine
where each order is actually processed. This delay determines the time span
over which the race game is played out and, as such, has a direct impact on
the expected number of additional events that might occur during the race.
– Exogenous events The behaviour of the HFTs is affected by two types of
exogenous events that happen independent of the HFTs actions:
1. Publication of news item causing a common value shock: the publi-
cations of news (either good or bad) is observed by everyone, and changes
the intrinsic value of an asset. This process is modelled as a Poisson process
with rate α (number of news events per time unit). The size of the shock is
fixed at ±σ. Throughout this paper we are assuming that the (half) spread
(s) is (strictly) less than σ (0 < s < σ).
2. Private value shock: These are only known to the LTs and cause one
of them them to join the matcher queue to hit the outstanding quote
(resulting in income for the market maker). These events are modelled as
an independent Poisson process with rate µ (number of LT arrivals per
time unit).
– Detailed chronology of the MZ game The description below is based on
the MZ paper, but attempts to clarify the process in more detail (cf. Fig 1).
Fig. 1 Chronology of the MZ game
– At t = −1, Strategy selection: all HFTs are informed about the game’s
parameters (i.e. α, µ, δ, σ and H). Based on this information they can
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then compute the expected utility as a function of the spread s (and the
sniping behaviour) for both the market maker and bandits (more details in
section 2.3), but are still unsure about which one applies to them. Taking
this uncertainty into account, each HFT decides on a spread s, and posts
a single bid and ask quote in an empty order book (i.e. initially each HFT
has a zero position2).
– At t = −1/2, Type assignation: one of the HFTs is chosen to be
the market maker, whereas all the others will become ”bandits” (eager to
snipe). The selection process of the market maker proceeds in two steps:
1. First, the HFT(s) that posted the smallest spread s are selected;
2. If there are multiple HFTs that posted the same minimal spread, then
one of them is selected at random (uniformly).
The fact that the outcome of this selection process is uncertain, is an
important aspect of the game that the HFTs need to take into account
when selecting a strategy at t = −1 as it is impossible for them to change
their position at a later time.
– At t = 0, Initial trigger starts game: one of two possible trigger events
occurs:
1. News event (public) that changes the value of the asset (i.e. value
shock of ±σ). This immediately triggers a race among the HFTs: the
market maker will try to update his stale quotes, while the bandits
will attempt to snipe. The winner of this race is randomly (uniform)
chosen among all contestants. The winner is known at time t = δ.
2. LT arrives at matcher (queue). This will result in a transaction, which
is invariably profitable for the market maker as he will cash in the
spread (s). This event does not elicit any reaction from the HFBs.
– Interval 0 < t < δ During this interval one (and only one) of three things
can happen:
1. An additional news event becomes (publicly) known (rate α).
2. Another LT arrives at the matcher, intent on interacting with the
market maker (rate µ);
3. Nothing happens.
– At t = δ, Conclusion and pay-off: The game concludes and the posi-
tions are used to compute the pay-off and corresponding utility for both the
bandits and market maker (see section 2.3 for more details). Importantly,
the utility of a negative pay-off is further inflated by the risk-aversion
factor γ:
utility =
{
pay-off if pay-off ≥ 0
γ · pay-off if pay-off < 0 (1)
where γ ≥ 1.
In the next sections we will explore some of the concepts in more detail, starting
with the detailed computation of the pay-off.
2 A zero position is when traders don’t own any amount of financial assets or commodity
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2.3 Payoff and utility computation
2.3.1 General principles
To compute the payoff for specific game-outcomes for each HFT we observe that
there are three sources of payoff:
– Changes in position: obtaining more (or less) of a financial asset results in
a corresponding change in wealth;
– Change of the intrinsic value of an asset: if the intrinsic value of an asset
changes (due to good or bad news), the owner benefits (or suffers) accordingly;
– Income from a successful transaction (either buy or sell). The income can
be both positive or negative depending on whether the HFT gets paid or needs
to pay to complete the transaction.
These observations can be summarized in the following equations:
payoff = position(t=δ) × value(t=δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
final
+ income︸ ︷︷ ︸
during
−position(t=0) × value(t=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial
but since we are assuming that all HFTs start with a zero position, the last term
vanishes and we therefore get the simplified formula:
payoff = position(t=δ) × value(t=δ) + income(t=δ) (2)
The corresponding utilities UM (for the market maker) and UB (for a bandit) can
then by inflating negative payoffs with the risk aversion factor γ (cf. eq. 1).
In addition to the primary MZ-parameters introduced above (viz. H,α, µ, δ
and γ) we will introduce some useful shorthand notation for derived quantities
that recur throughout this paper:
– α := αδ/2 and µ := µδ/2 are (half) the expected number of news and LT
arrivals, respectively, in the interval between the start of game (t = 0) and
its conclusion (at t = δ). Since we are assuming that δ is sufficiency small so
that we expect less than one event to happen in each interval, we have the
following strict inequality:
(α+ µ)δ < 1 or again α+ µ <
1
2
. (3)
– β := α/(α+µ) is the probability that the trigger event will be arrival of news
rather than an LT arrival. Obviously, the latter therefore has probability 1−β.
– Some additional notation to streamline the equations below:
q := γ − 1 and m = 1− µ and θ = 2 αµ
α+ µ
. (4)
Notice that θ is the harmonic mean of α and µ therefore tends to be closer to
the smaller of the two.
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2.3.2 Payoffs for specific event-sequences
Since the chronology of the MZ game is strictly defined, there are only 20 possible
event sequences that can happen between the initial trigger (at t = 0) and the
final conclusion of the game at t = δ. All the possible combinations and their
corresponding payoffs (and utilities) are given in [16] and summarized for the
reader’s convenience in Table 1. It is important to realise that bandits can only
benefit from the game if their sniping attempt is successful. Hence, if there is
no race (i.e. trigger event is the arrival of a liquidity trader), or if a bandit loses
the race, then their payoff equals zero. Furthermore, if a race ensues which the
market maker loses, only the successful sniper will gain utility (2nd utility column
in table).
For a detailed explanation of each event’s payoff and probability we refer to
the appendix C, but we will illustrate the general ideas using NG-LA (first event is
good news and the second event is arrival of LT on ask) as a specific example:
– Probability of event: Since, in general, the first (trigger) event is either the
publication of a news item (rate α) or the arrival of a liquidity trader (LT, rate
µ), the probability of the former equals β := α/(α+µ). Since for half of these
events the news is good, the probability of the trigger event being NG equals
β/2. The probability of a second news event arriving in the interval [0, δ)
equals αδ and if we insist on this news item also being good, the probability
halves to αδ/2 = α. Since the two events are independent, we can simply
multiply the two probabilities.
– Payoff of event: In the case of NG-LA, the first (i.e. trigger) event is good
news and hence increases the intrinsic value of the asset (by an amount σ). As
a consequence, the market maker (MM) will race to the exchange to cancel
his (now stale) order in order to prevent loses, while all other HFTs (bandits)
race to snap up the higher value asset at the outdated low price (sniping).
The second event is the arrival of LT on ask (value +s) and means that an
uninformed liquidity trader (LT) happens to join the queue at the matching
engine ahead of all the HFTs (who are still racing) and manages to buy the
asset at the outdated (low) ask price. This is of course bad news for the market
maker who ends up selling an asset below its current market value. The payoff
for all the bandits is zero as they failed to snipe. By referring to equation (2),
we can compute payoff for market maker:
payoffM = (position)(t=δ) × (value)(t=δ) + income
= (−1)× (v + σ) + (v + s)
= −(σ − s) (5)
Since the payoff is negative, the corresponding utility (uM ) is inflated by the
risk aversion factor γ, hence:
uM = −γ(σ − s) and uB = 0. (6)
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For more details, see:
KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.1)
Utilities
MM loses race MM wins race
(Prob = h) (Prob = 1− h)
Event code 1st and 2nd event prob MM B (sniper!) MM B (all!)
NG-NG 1
2
β α −γ(2σ − s) 2σ − s 0 0
NG-NB 1
2
β α s −γs 0 0
NG-LA 1
2
β µ −γ(σ − s) 0 −γ(σ − s) 0
NG-LB 1
2
β µ 2s σ − s σ + s 0
NG-no 1
2
β 1− 2(α+ µ) −γ(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
NB-NG 1
2
β α s −γs 0 0
NB-NB 1
2
β α −γ(2σ − s) 2σ − s 0 0
NB-LA 1
2
β µ 2s σ − s σ + s 0
NB-LB 1
2
β µ −γ(σ − s) 0 −γ(σ − s) 0
NB-no 1
2
β 1− 2(α+ µ) −γ(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
No race!
MM B (all!) - -
LA-NG 1
2
(1− β) α −γ(σ − s) 0 - -
LA-NB 1
2
(1− β) α σ + s 0 - -
LA-LA 1
2
(1− β) µ s 0 - -
LA-LB 1
2
(1− β) µ 2s 0 - -
LA-no 1
2
(1− β) 1− 2(α+ µ) s 0 - -
LB-NG 1
2
(1− β) α σ + s 0 - -
LB-NB 1
2
(1− β) α −γ(σ − s) 0 - -
LB-LA 1
2
(1− β) µ 2s 0 - -
LB-LB 1
2
(1− β) µ s 0 - -
LB-no 1
2
(1− β) 1− 2(α+ µ) s 0 - -
Legend NG/NB: Good/Bad News, LA/LB = liquidity trader on ask/bid, no = no event
Table 1 Payoff table for all possible events in MZ-game. For instance, in NG-LA, the first event
is good news and the second event is arrival of LT on ask. The negative payoffs are made explicit
using a minus sign and are inflated with the risk aversion factor γ ≥ 1 in order to obtain the
actual utility. The trigger event for the first ten cases is the publication of a news item which
sets off a race. A bandit can only receive payoff if he succeeds in winning that race, in all other
cases there is no payoff. For that reason we only list the utility of the bandit that was successful
as a sniper. For the explanation of the probabilities that the market maker will lose or win the
race, we refer the reader to section 3.2). Notice that for the last ten events for which the trigger
event is the arrival of liquidity trader, there is no race, and so no need to distinguish between
the possible fates of the market maker. For detailed computation of the table, see appendix C.
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2.3.3 Expected utilities
Table 1 lists the utilities of specific events for both the market maker and any of the
bandits once we specify the spread s. However, in the actual game these events
are generated according to a stochastic process and the utilities are therefore
stochastic variables (denoted by capital letters UM and UB). To compute the
expected utilities (EUM and EUB) we need to sum the utilities of all relevant
events weighted by the corresponding probabilities. The event probabilities are
listed explicitly in the table. But we also have to take into account the probabilities
with which any of the HFTs will win or lose the race as this changes their pay-off.
Below we explore this in more detail for the market maker and bandit separately.
Market maker A glance at Table 1 shows that the market maker receives non-
trivial utility for all the events. To streamline the exposition we will introduce
a wildcard and denote all event codes that correspond to a news trigger event
as N***. Each of these events occurs with probability β/2 and provokes a race.
Similarly, events triggered by an LT arrival will be denoted as L*** and occur
with probability (1− β)/2 but don’t spark a race. Furthermore, when there is an
actual race, the market maker’s utility depends on whether or not he beats the
other HFTs to the finish. To take this into account, we introduce h to denote the
probability that the market maker will lose the race. Since all the HFTs enter the
race and have the same probability of winning it, we conclude:
h := P {MM loses race | there is a race} = H − 1
H
. (7)
Gathering all this information we can now express the expected utility of the
market maker as a weighted sum over the possible second event e2 where p(e2)
and uM (e2) are the corresponding event probability and utility, respectively:
EUM (s) =
β
2
[ ∑
e2∈N∗∗∗
p(e2) {huM (e2 | MM loses) + (1− h)uM (e2 | MM wins)}
]
+
(
1− β
2
)[ ∑
e2∈L∗∗∗
p(e2)uM (e2)
]
. (8)
In section 3.2 we will see how we need to re-interpret this expression in the case
of probabilistic sniping.
Individual bandit The expected utility for an individual bandit can be computed
along similar lines. In fact, the calculation is easier as a bandit only receives payoff
if his sniping attempt is successful. If there is a race (event code N***), the
probability that a specific, individual bandit will win equals
g := P {bandit wins race | there is a race} = 1
H
(9)
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as there are H agents in the race. Notice that this is identical to the probability
1− h that the market maker will win the race – for the obvious reason. It might
therefore seem an unnecessary complication of the notation, but once we introduce
the concept of probabilistic sniping, these two quantities will diverge in meaning.
Since all L*** events result in zero utility for a bandit (no race), we only need
to sum over the N*** events, resulting in the following expression:
EUB(s) =
β
2
g
∑
e2∈N∗∗∗
p(e2)uB(e2 | MM loses race) where g = 1
H
.
(10)
See KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.2.1)
Some simplifications Expanding eqs. 8 and 10 is straightforward but tedious and
therefore deferred to appendix D. However, even without plowing through the
algebra, a cursory inspection of table 1 shows that all event utilities are proportional
to either the spread s or the difference (wσ ± s, where w = 1, 2) of spread and
jumpsize σ. From this, we can introduce the following notational simplifications:
– Rescaling We can factor out σ by dividing both the spread s and utility U
by σ. This amounts to rescaling both spread and utility by using the jumpsize
σ as a natural yardstick:
s −→ s˜ := s
σ
and U −→ U˜ := U
σ
This rescaling allows us to fix σ ≡ 1 which slightly simplifies the equations
in the remainder of the paper without having any impact on the qualitative
nature of the conclusions. Notice that we will drop the tildes for notational
convenience, and simply use s and U to denote spread and utility measured
using σ as unit.
– Utilities are linear in s The expected utilities for both the market maker
(EUM ) and bandit (EUB) are linear combinations of the utilities in the table
and therefore result in linear (or more precisely, affine) functions in the spread
s:
EUB(s) = A(1−s)+Bs, where A := EUB(s = 0) and B := EUB(s = 1),
(11)
and similarly:
EUM (s) = C(1−s)+Ds, where C := EUM (s = 0) and D := EUM (s = 1).
(12)
Hence, the values A,B,C and D are the endpoints of the linear line-segments
that represent the expected utilities for the market maker and a bandit as a
function of spread 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 (also see Fig. 2). Expressing the utilities in terms
of these endpoints is useful as it simplifies some the formulae in the remainder
of this paper.
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2.4 Computing the point of indifference
Recall from the description of the MZ-game in section 2.2 that at the inception of
the game (i.e. at t = −1 when they need to specify the spread s for their quotes),
the HFTs are agnostic about their eventual role in the game as this is only assigned
at t = − 12 . The intersection point between the two utilities will therefore play a
pivotal role in the HFT’s decision making as it represents the spread (hereafter
denoted by s∗) that makes them indifferent as to which role they will play. In
terms of the quantities A,B,C and D as defined above, it is straightforward
to determine s∗ and the corresponding utility u∗ := EUB(s∗) ≡ EUM (s∗) by
computing the intersection of the linear utility functions (also see Fig. 2):
s∗ =
(A− C)
(A− C) + (D −B) and u
∗ =
(AD −BC)
(A− C) + (D −B) (13)
It is shown in [16] that, if u∗ > 0 (intersection lies above x-axis), the MZ game
has a unique pure Nash equilibrium in which all HFTs will pick the optimal
spread s∗ and expect to earn the utility u∗.
For more details,see:
KPD_supplementary_material_numeric.ipynb (section.2)
However, if u∗ ≤ 0 (intersection lies on or below x-axis), things are less
straightforward as pursuing the above strategy will now result in losses for both
the market maker and the bandits. One of the contribution in [16] is the realisa-
tion that probabilistic sniping might suggest an additional equilibrium. This will
be explored in detail in the next section.
3 Probabilistic versus Sure Sniping
3.1 The rationale for probabilistic sniping
Up till now we have assumed that all bandits will race to the exchange whenever
an opportunity arises (i.e. whenever the trigger event is the publication of a news
item). This seems reasonable as a successful snipe is the only way a bandit can
gain positive utility. However, a careful inspection of Table 1 reveals that sniping
has a potential down-side. For instance, if a positive news fact is followed by a
negative one (NG-NB), or vice versa (NB-NG), the sniper acquires an asset that
has no added value and, as a consequence, incurs negative utility. Hence, under
these circumstances it might be more profitable to refrain from sniping, or to snipe
only occasionally. This is translated into the idea of probabilistic sniping in which
an individual bandit enters the race with sniping probability p.
Obviously, less sniping is always advantageous for the market maker as sniping
reduces his payoff. So it seems that there are situations (e.g. high news rates α, see
caption of Fig. 7) for which probabilistic sniping could actually be advantageous
for all parties. In the next sections we will quantify in more detail how probabilistic
sniping affects the various utilities.
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Fig. 2 Graph representing the expected utilities EUB(s) (line AB) and EUM (s) (line CD) for a
bandit and the market maker, respectively. The HFTs will select spread s∗ (resulting in expected
utility u∗) by determining the intersection of the two utilities (point of indifference). For the
time being, we only consider sure sniping which corresponds to p = 1 . For more details on
probabilistic sniping (for which p < 1), see section 3.
3.2 The impact of probabilistic sniping
We start by defining more formally the sniping probability p to be the probability
that an individual bandit will participate in the race, given that there is a race,
i.e. given that the initial trigger event is ”news”:
p := P {Individual bandit will race | Tr(igger) = N(ews)} (14)
Obviously, p = 1 in the case of sure sniping. Notice also that this probability is
only relevant for bandits, as the market maker will always enter the race! The
corresponding change in sniping behaviour implies that we have to re-evaluate
the probabilities h (probability that the market maker will lose the race) and g
(probability that an individual bandit who entered the race, will actually win it)
as both quantities will now depend on p.
1. Probability h(p) that market maker will lose the race In the case of sure
sniping, all HFTs enter the race and since they all have equal probability of
winning, the probability that the market maker will lose equals h = (H−1)/H.
However, when individual bandits snipe (independently!) with a probability
p < 1, the probability that the market maker will get sniped depends on the
number of bandits that do attempt to out-race him, and therefore depends on
p. We will therefore denote it as h(p), defined formally as:
h(p) := P {MM will lose MZ race | individual bandits enter race with prob p}
(15)
To snipe or not to snipe, that’s the question! 15
A straightforward calculation (see Appendix E) shows that
h(p) =
(1− p)H − (1−Hp)
Hp
(16)
which indeed reduces to h ≡ h(1) = (H − 1)/H in the case of sure sniping
(p = 1). Furthermore, using the expansion
(1−p)H = 1−Hp+H(H − 1)
2
p2−H(H − 1)(H − 2)
3!
p3+. . .+(−p)H (17)
shows that we have the following asymptoptics for small values of p ↓ 0:
h(p) =
(
H − 1
2
)
p+ o(p2), (18)
whence limp↓0 h(p) = 0. The probability h(p) plays a crucial role in the utility
computation for both the market maker and the bandits.
2. Conditional probability g(p) that an individual bandit wins race, given
he enters race In the case of probabilistic sniping, the probability that an
individual bandit will win the race needs to be conditioned on him actually
entering the race, as this is no longer a sure thing. Therefore, we introduce
the following formal definition of this conditional probability:
g(p) := P{individual bandit will win race | he participates in the race}
(19)
The actual computation g(p) is deferred to Appendix E but yields:
g(p) =
(1− p)H − (1− pH)
H(H − 1)p2 =
h(p)
(H − 1)p . (20)
Intuitively, this result makes sense: h(p) is the probability that a bandit rather
than the market maker will win the race, which is then divided by (H − 1)p,
i.e. the expected number of bandits in the race.
Another way to see the connection between h(p) and g(p) is to observe that
pg(p) is the un-conditional probability that an individual bandit will win the
race. For this to happen, the market maker needs to lose the race (probability
h(p)) and each of the (H − 1) bandits has the same odds. Hence:
pg(p) =
h(p)
H − 1 (21)
Notice also that if every bandit races for sure (p = 1), then the probability
that an individual bandit will win, simplifies to g ≡ g(1) = 1/H as expected.
In the same vein, using the asymptotics in eq. (18), it follows that
lim
p↓0
g(p) = 1/2. (22)
This also makes sense: if p ≈ 0 then any bandit that is in the race will probably
be the only bandit in that race, and therefore will have a probability of 1/2 to
outrun the racing market maker.
For more details, see:
(KPD_supplementary_material_2.ipynb)
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3.3 Expected utilities under probabilistic sniping
Now that we have a precise definition of the probabilities h(p) and g(p) we are
in a position to determine the expected utilities for both the market maker and
individual bandits under probabilistic sniping.
3.3.1 Expected utility for bandit
As pointed out above, the bandit will only race if the trigger event (Tr) is the
arrival of a news item (N). Recall that this happens with probability β = α/(α+µ).
Hence, we can compute the expected utility by conditioning on the trigger event
being news. Furthermore, we need to take into account that the bandit will only
participate in the race with probability p, and needs to win the race in order to
gain utility. We therefore find:
EUB = E(UB | Tr = N)P (Tr = N)
= E(UB | Tr = N)β
= E(UB | Tr = N & bandit enters race)P{bandit enters race}β
= E(UB | Tr = N & bandit enters and wins race)P{bandit wins race | he races} pβ
= E(UB | Tr = N & bandit enters and wins race) g(p)pβ
From this we conclude:
EUB(s, p) = βg(p)pE(UB | Tr = N & bandit enters and wins race) (23)
To further elaborate the expression for EUB we need to condition the RHS on the
second event. This amounts to summing the utilities (weighted with the probabil-
ities of the second event) in the sniper column of Table, which yields:
and a straightforward but tedious calculation shows:
E(UB | Tr = N & bandit enters and wins race) = (1− µ)(1− s)− αqs.
Plugging this into eq. 23 shows how the expected utility of each bandit depends
on spread s, sniping probability p and risk aversion γ ≥ 1:
EUB(s, p, γ) = βpg(p) {(1− µ)(1− s)− α(γ − 1)s} = βpg(p) {m(1− s)− αqs} .
(24)
In particular, this means that the end points of the line segment, as functions of
p and γ, are given by:
A ≡ A(p) := EUB(s = 0) = mβpg(p)
B ≡ B(p, γ) := EUB(s = 1) = −α(γ − 1)βpg(p) (25)
We conclude this paragraph with a straightforward but useful observation. The
value s∗∗ for which the bandit’s utility becomes zero (i.e. the intersection point
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with the x-axis, see Fig. 3) does not depend on the sniping probability. Indeed, a
straightforward computation shows:
s∗∗ =
A
A+B
=
m
m− αq (26)
This means that geometrically speaking, probabilistic sniping makes the bandit’s
utility function pivot about the intersection point s∗∗ towards the horizontal axis
(see Fig. 3).
For more details, see:
KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb(section.2.1)
3.3.2 Expected utility for market maker
The computation of the expected utility EUM proceeds along similar lines but is
somewhat more involved. Again, we start by conditioning on the trigger event (Tr)
which can either be the arrival of news (N, prob = β ) or a liquidity trader (LT,
prob = 1− β):
EUM = E(UM | Tr = N)β + E(UM | Tr = LT )(1− β)
The second term (trigger event is the arrival of a liquidity trader) is relatively
simple as no sniping is involved. A straightforward computation yields:
E(UM | Tr = LT ) = (1 + µ)s− αq(1− s) (27)
In case the trigger event is news, the market maker’s payoff depends on whether
or not he loses the ensuing race and therefore gets sniped. Using the notation
introduced above we conclude:
E(UM | Tr = N) = E(UM | Tr = N & MM loses race)h(p)
+ E(UM | Tr = N & MM wins race)(1− h(p))
Again, a straightforward but tedious calculation shows that the market maker’s
utility in case he gets sniped equals:
E(UM | Tr = N & MM loses race) = (2µ− αq)s− γ(1− µ)(1− s) (28)
Similarly:
E(UM | Tr = N & MM wins race) = ((γ + 1)s− γ + 1)µ (29)
From the expressions above we can constitute the linear function EUM (s) but
in the remainder of the paper we only need explicit expressions for the endpoints:
C ≡ C(p, γ) := EUM (s = 0) = −
{
qθ + β(mγ − µq)h(p)}
D ≡ D(p, γ) := EUM (s = 1) = (1 + µ)− β(m+ αqh(p)) (30)
See also: KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.2.2)
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3.3.3 Indifference spread and utility for probabilistic sniping
From the discussion above we know that for probabilistic sniping the end-points
of the linear utility functions are replaced by their probabilistic counterparts:
A→ A(p), B → B(p), C → C(p), and D → D(p).
Using the same logic as before we conclude that the point of indifference for
probabilistic sniping is given by (cf. eqs. 13):
s∗(p) =
A(p)− C(p)
(A(p)− C(p)) + (D(p)−B(p)) (31)
u∗(p) =
A(p)D(p)−B(p)C(p)
(A(p)− C(p)) + (D(p)−B(p)) (32)
For ease of reference, we will denote the common denominator by
Q(p) := A(p)− C(p) +D(p)−B(p), (33)
and introduce
N(p) := A(p)D(p)−B(p)C(p). (34)
Hence, we arrive at the useful shorthand
u∗(p) =
N(p)
Q(p)
. (35)
See also: KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.4)
3.3.4 Impact of risk aversion and probabilistic sniping on utilities
Since the point of indifference is completely determined by the utility endpoints
(A, B, C and D), it is helpful to make their dependence on the parameters γ (risk
aversion) and p (individual sniping probability) explicit. To this end we hark back
to eqs. (25) and (30), from which we can compute:
dA
dγ
= 0,
dB
dγ
= −αβpg(p) < 0,
dC
dγ
= −(θ + β(1− 2µ)h(p)) < 0, dD
dγ
= −αβh(p) < 0.
(36)
It therefore transpires that increasing risk aversion pushes the utility endpoints
(except for A) down, dragging the utility u∗ along. We will return to this obser-
vation in section 4 where we will show how increasing risk-aversion will induce
transitions in sniping behaviour.
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The dependence of the utilities on the sniping probability p can be classified
in a similar fashion:
dA
dp
= mβ(g(p) + pg′(p)) > 0,
dB
dp
= −αqβ(g(p) + pg′(p)) < 0
dC
dp
= −mβh′(p) < 0, dD
dp
= −αβqh′(p) < 0.
(37)
Notice that since g(p) + pg′(p) = (pg(p))′ = h′(p)/(H − 1) > 0, it follows that
(see Fig 3) probabilistic sniping (i.e. reducing p) will pivot the bandit’s utility
towards smaller values about the fixed intersection point s∗∗. Similarly, since both
dC/dp < 0, dD/dp < 0 the utility for the market maker (unsurprisingly) shifts
upwards when p is lowered and the bandits snipe only occasionally.
See also: KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.3)
Fig. 3 Basic geometry of probabilistic sniping: The solid lines (AB for the bandit, and CD for the
market maker) represent the expected utilities (as function of the spread s) in the case of sure
sniping. The resulting point of indifference (s∗, u∗) is non-playable since u∗ < 0. Reducing the
probability of sniping to p < 1 pushes the MM utility function CD upwards (as the MM benefits
from less sniping), while the bandit’s utility pivots about its zero crossing. As a consequence, the
point of indifference moves to the new intersection point (s∗(p), u∗(p)) which is now playable
as u∗(p) > 0.
3.4 When is probabilistic sniping advantageous?
3.4.1 Geometric interpretation: Probabilistic sniping shifts point of indifference
Is there an advantage in switching from sure sniping to probabilistic sniping? Ob-
viously, less sniping is advantageous for the market maker as his pay-off is reduced
by sniping. In section 3.1 we argued that less sniping might also protect bandits
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from acquiring assets whose values are unstable (e.g. due to subsequent emergence
of contradictory news). Some further intuition is gleaned from Fig. 4, which illus-
trates the difference between sure and probabilistic sniping. More specifically, let
us assume that sure sniping results in an equilibrium E such that u∗ := u(s∗) = 0.
Sure sniping (p = 1) is represented by the two blue lines (AB and CD, expected
utility for bandit and market maker, respectively). Changing to probabilistic snip-
ing (p < 1) results in two different lines (A′B′ and C ′D′, respectively). Notice
that A′B′ pivots about the equilibrium point E, while C ′D′ shifts upwards (as
less sniping means less risk for the market maker). As a consequence, the new
intersection point E′ will yield a (strictly) positive utility.
Another way to put this is that the derivative du∗/dp (evaluated at p = 1)
is negative: smaller values for p result in higher utility (for a concrete, numerical
example, see Fig 5 below). In section 4 below, we will recast this geometric insight
into an algebraic expression, but first we will show that this new equilibrium is not
a Nash equilibrium for the one-shot MZ1.
Fig. 4 LEFT: Geometric representation that illustrates why probabilistic sniping is advantageous
when u∗ = 0. The blue lines AB (bandit) and CD (market maker) represent the expected utilities
under sure sniping yielding a point of indifference E corresponding to zero utility u∗(p = 1) = 0.
Probabilistic sniping (with sniping probability p < 1) shift these utilities to A’B’ and C’D’
respectively, resulting in a new point of indifference E’ that corresponds to strictly better utility
u∗(p < 1) > 0. RIGHT: Configuration in which probabilistic sniping results in lower expected
utility and sure sniping is to be preferred. See main text for more information.
3.4.2 Does (s∗(p), u∗(p)) constitute a Nash equilibrium of the MZ1 game?
One of the reasons why for p < 1 the new intersection point (s∗(p), u∗(p)) is not
considered in the MZ paper (even if u∗(p) > 0), is that it does not constitute a
Nash equilibrium for the (single-shot) MZ game. To see this, it suffices to realise
that when p < 1, a bandit will always benefit from unilaterally deviating to sure
sniping (assuming u∗(p) ≡ UB(s∗(p)) > 0). As a consequence, these intersection
points are uninteresting in terms of the single-shot version of the MZ game.
However, the reason that probabilistic sniping (and the corresponding role of
s∗(p) and u∗(p)) is of interest nonetheless, is that things change when we will
consider (in section 5) the infinite horizon repeated game version (MZ∞). The
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Fig. 5 An example where probabilistic sniping is advantageous even though sure sniping results
in a strictly positive utility. In this example, we depict the evolution of the point of indifference
as a function of the sniping probability p, i.e. (s∗(p), u∗(p)), where p starts at p = 1 and is
decremented with steps of 0.05 to p = 0. Notice how the expected utility rises from 0.02 for
sure sniping (p = 1) to a maximum of 0.05 for p ≈ 0.15, before dropping to zero when there is
no sniping (p = 0).
promise of higher pay-offs means that even purely selfish agents are incentivised to
collaborate if they expect this cooperation to be profitable. This new equilibrium
is stabilized by the implicit threat that, if anyone breaks the tacit plan, opponents
will do the same and opportunities will instantly evaporate. Working out whether
cooperation is the rational choice involves estimating what is most favourable: the
exceptional but one-off payoff one stands to gain from defecting, or the smaller
but accumulating payoffs that result from continuing collaboration that over time,
will eclipse the former. For more details, we refer to section 5.
4 Characterising the transitions in sniping behaviour
In this section we use a geometric argument to deduce the general conditions under
which, first, the transition from sure to probabilistic sniping occurs, and second,
probabilistic sniping ceases to be profitable (i.e. transition from probabilistic to no
sniping). We will then show how these general conditions can be related to risk
aversion γ and how they give rise to two thresholds (γK and γL) that govern
these transitions.
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4.1 Transition from pure to probabilistic sniping
Geometric interpretation As argued above, the equilibrium (s∗, u∗) can be seen
as a function of the sniping probability p, i.e. (s∗(p), u∗(p)). To decide whether
probabilistic sniping is advantageous, we need to determine when the slope of the
tangent to the curve u∗(p) at p = 1 changes sign (see Fig. 6):
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=1
> 0 (sure sniping) −→ du
∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=1
< 0 (probabilistic sniping)
(38)
Indeed, if the slope of this tangent is positive, it means that reducing p from 1
(sure sniping) to a lower value p < 1 decreases the value of u∗(p). Hence, sure
sniping is better than probabilistic sniping. Conversely, if the slope of the tangent is
negative, moving from sure to probabilistic sniping (i.e. reducing p) does improve
u∗(p) and therefore probabilistic sniping is to be preferred.
Using the notation introduced in eq. (35) we know that u∗(p) = N(p)/Q(p),
and hence
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=1
=
N ′(1)Q(1)−N(1)Q′(1)
Q2(1)
(39)
Hence the threshold is determined by the equation:
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=1
= 0 ⇐⇒ N ′(1)Q(1)−N(1)Q′(1) = 0 (40)
See : KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.5)
4.2 Transition from probabilistic to cessation of sniping (non-sniping)
If the expected utility associated with the sure sniping equilibrium is sufficiently
negative (i.e. u∗(s∗, p = 1)  0), even probabilistic sniping will not be able to
turn this into profits. Geometrically, this corresponds to a situation in which the
path traced by (s∗(p), u∗(p)) will never enter (strictly) positive territory before it
hits the x-axis at p = 0 (see Fig. 6 bottom-right panel).
This transition can therefore be characterised by a condition which is analo-
gous to the characterisation of the transition from pure to probabilistic sniping in
eq.(38), this time however focusing on the tangent at p = 0:
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=0
> 0 (probabilistic sniping) −→ du
∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=0
< 0 (no sniping)
(41)
This transition therefore occurs when
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=0
= 0 (42)
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Expanding
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=0
=
N ′(0)Q(0)−N(0)Q′(0)
Q2(0)
and using that N(0) = 0 while Q(0) = D−C > 0, we see that eq. (42) simplifies
to:
N ′(0) = 0. (43)
Expanding equation (43):
N ′(0) = A′(0)D(0) +A(0)D′(0)−B′(0)C(0)−B(0)C ′(0)
and using A(0) = B(0) = 0, condition (43) can be further simplified to:
N ′(0) ≡ A(0)D′(0)−B′(0)C(0) = 0. (44)
See : KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.6)
4.3 Increasing risk aversion induces transitions
In section 3.3.4 we showed how the endpoints of the utilities (except for A) are
pushed down by increasing risk aversion γ, dragging the point of indifference
(s∗, u∗) down in their wake. Since u∗ decreases, there will be a value for γ beyond
which probabilistic sniping becomes more favourable than sure sniping. Increasing
γ even further will eventually result in a utility that is so low that even probabilistic
sniping is no longer profitable. Hence we see that increasing risk aversion γ is
one way to induce the two transitions in sniping behaviour discussed above. In
this section we will translate the general transition conditions (40) and (44) into
precise transition thresholds for γ.
4.3.1 Threshold γK : Transition from sure to probabilistic sniping
Both N and Q depend on risk aversion γ and expanding the transition condition
eq. (40) as a function of γ yields a cubic polynomial (denoted by K(γ)), for which
we need to find a zero-crossing:
N ′(1)Q(1)−N(1)Q′(1) ≡ K3γ3 +K2γ2 +K1γ +K0︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=K(γ)
= 0 (45)
The computation of the polynomial coefficients is cumbersome and uninteresting
and is therefore relegated to the supplementary material.
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.5.1)
In terms of this notation, the threshold condition in eq. (40) amounts to finding
the appropriate zero-crossing K(γ) = 0. Recall that a cubic equation has at least
one solution (zero-crossing). However, we need to make sure that this solution
satisfies γ ≥ 1 and can therefore be interpreted as a risk aversion factor. This is
proven in the following theorem in which we also define the transition threshold:
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Proposition 1 (Risk aversion threshold for transition from pure to probabilistic sniping)
The cubic polynomial K(γ) specified in eq. (45) has a unique zero-crossing greater
than 1. We will denote this unique zero-crossing by γK ≥ 1 as it is the threshold
that governs the transition from sure to probabilistic sniping.
The proof of this proposition can be found in appendix F.
Fig. 6 Examples of transition thresholds in sniping behaviour. In the above example we fix the
parameters α = .45, µ = .5, δ = .5, H = 5. From these values we can compute the threshold
values γK = 2.515 and γL = 7.831 (for a definition of γK and γL see section 4). Next we
set γ to four different values: γ = 1.7575 (slightly risk-averse, sure sniping), γ = γK = 2.5150
(risk averse, knife edge), γ = 3.5 (probabilistic sniping), and finally, γ = γL = 7.8313 (strongly
risk-averse, no more sniping). Notice that in the bottom left picture probabilistic sniping yields
a better utility, even though the utility for sure sniping is positive!
See also: KPD_supplementary_material_numeric.ipynb (section.3.4)
4.3.2 Threshold γL: Transition from probabilistic sniping to non-sniping
A similar approach can be taken to quantify how a further increase in risk aversion
γ gives rise to the threshold γL beyond which even probabilistic sniping is no
longer profitable, i.e. both sure and probabilistic sniping results in negative utility
u∗(s∗, p) < 0, (∀ 0 ≤ p ≤ 1).
To snipe or not to snipe, that’s the question! 25
In order to determine this threshold value, we expand transition condition
eq.(44) as a function of γ and obtain a quadratic polynomial (denoted by L(γ))
for which a zero-crossing needs to be found:
N ′(0) = 0 ⇐⇒ L(γ) := L2(γ − 1)2 + L0 = 0, (46)
which can easily be solved explicitly. We can summarize all of these observations
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Risk aversion threshold for transition from probabilistic to non-sniping)
There is a unique threshold γL for risk aversion γ that governs the transition from
probabilistic to no sniping. Specifically:
γL = 1 +
√
(1− µ)Z
α θ
where Z = 1 + µ− β(1− µ). (47)
The proof of this proposition is straightforward and can be found in Appendix
section G.
See: KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.6)
4.4 Optimal sniping probability p∗K
In the preceding sections we have shown that increasing risk aversion (γ > 1)
creates multiple sniping regimes for the bandits:
– 1 ≤ γ < γK : Sure sniping is most profitable; This situation corresponds to the
top left panel in Fig. 6.
– γK ≤ γ < γL: Probabilistic sniping results in higher utilities; in fact, there
is an optimal sniping probability p∗K (see below) which results in a maximal
(positive) utility. This situation corresponds to the bottom left panel in Fig. 6.
– γ ≥ γL: No sniping (resulting in zero utility) is the best option. This situation
corresponds to the bottom right panel in Fig. 6.
The situation in the second case γK < γ < γL is schematically illustrated in
Fig. 8. It follows that there is an optimal sniping probability that yields the largest
utility:
p∗K := argmax
p
u∗(p) (48)
We introduce the following notation for the corresponding utility u∗K and spread
s∗K . Since this is a unique optimal point it provides a natural focal point for the
game [19]. In addition, Fig. 9 compares the expected utilities under both sure and
(optimal) probabilistic sniping as a function of risk aversion γ, showing clearly
that profitability can be sustained for higher values of γ.
See: u_depend_on_gamma_p_v2.m
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Fig. 7 These figures show the evolution of transition thresholds γK (blue) and γL (red) as
functions of the rates for the trigger event: arrival rate of news (α, TOP) and arrival rate of
LT (µ, bottom). Notice (top) how increasing the news rate α results a faster transition to
probabilistic sniping (as explained in section 3.1 ).
5 Optimal probabilistic sniping as SPE in repeated MZ∞ game
In the previous section we have shown that if the risk aversion factor γ satisfies
γK < γ < γL, all bandits are better off if they implement probabilistic sniping, i.e.
engage in racing with probability p∗K only. However, this is not a Nash equilibrium
for the stage game, as bandits will be tempted to snipe more frequently. This is
a situation reminiscent of the classical prisoner’s dilemma (PD) where the Nash
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Fig. 8 Definition of p∗K : When probabilistic sniping is advantageous (i.e. γK < γ < γL) reducing
the sniping probability p shifts the equilibrium position (s∗(p), u∗(p)) along a concave arc, the
top of which corresponds to the optimal sniping probability p∗K .
equilibrium forces the players into a strategy that results in the worst social welfare
possible [12].
However, it is well-known that if we repeat the prisoner’s dilemma an indef-
inite number of times, it becomes possible to devise strategies that do yield the
optimal utility. This reversal of fortune is due to the fact that agents can build up
reputations that encourage collaboration that is guaranteed to be profitable for
all parties. Exactly the same rationale will also play out in the (infinite horizon)
repeated MZ-game (MZ∞).
5.1 The MZ stage game as a sequential game
Game Tree Before we explore the strategies that are available in the (indefinitely)
repeated MZ game (a.k.a. MZ∞), we need to pause for a minute and clarify
the nature of the strategies that are available to the players in the single-shot
stage game (a.k.a. MZ1). To this end, it is helpful to realise that the stage game
involves different interdependent steps and can therefore be seen as a sequential
game involving a (possibly) random move by “nature”. Below, we give an explicit
representation of the decision tree for the game and clarify a subtle but important
point in the interpretation of probabilistic sniping.
In section 2.2, we already outlined the detailed chronology of the various defin-
ing events in the game. For the interpretation of the MZ game as a sequential
game it is also helpful to highlight the various steps for an individual HFT in the
corresponding decision tree (also see Fig. 10):
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Fig. 9 TOP: The figure shows the equilibrium utility spread as a function of risk aversion in
both sure sniping (u∗K(p = 1) blue line) and optimal probabilistic sniping (u
∗
K = u(p = p
∗
K),
red line). BOTTOM: corresponding optimal sniping probability p∗K , which drops from p
∗
K = 1
(sure sniping) when γ ≤ γK to 0 (no sniping) when γ ≥ γL.
1. HFT (at time t = −1) has to choose a spread s from the continuous action
space 0 ≤ s ≤ σ. Alternatively, he can refrain from playing altogether (NULL
action resulting in zero utility).
2. Nature (at time t = −1/2) selects one of the HFTs as MM (using the rule
specified earlier in section 2.2), relegating the others to the role of bandit;
3. At t = 0, each HFT knows its type (market maker or bandit) and can therefore
make his reaction to the trigger event (news or LT arrival) contingent on his
type. This results in a new bifurcation of the decision tree:
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– if he’s bandit: he has to choose between quitting the game (NULL-action
with utility 0), or some form of sniping: sure p = 1, no (p = 0) or proba-
bilistic sniping (0 < p < 1) resulting in a utility uB(s, p).
– if he’s MM: he either proceeds and the game ends with utility uM (s, p)
(which actually also depends on p), or he withdraws from the game (NULL
with utility 0):
Fig. 10 The MZ game as a sequential game against nature. Notice that in the last decision
point, the MM is uncertain about his utility uM (s, p) as it depends on the bandit’s sniping
probability which at the moment of decision is unknown to him!
Actions and Strategies Disregarding the trivial NULL action, what actions and
strategies are available to the players? At the first decision point, it is clear that
each HFT can choose a spread s, which corresponds to a pure but continuous
action.
At the second HFT decision point, the HFTs know their type. The strategy
for the market maker is straightforward: if the trigger event is the publication of
a news item, the intrinsic value of the asset jumps and he will race to cancel his
stale quotes. The choice of strategies for the other HFTs (bandits) is more subtle.
Indeed, in the MZ paper [16], the authors describe mixed sniping as randomly
mixing between the pure and discrete strategies of sniping and and not sniping.
As a consequence, mixed sniping will only feature as a Nash equilibrium when
the bandits are indifferent between sniping and not sniping! In our interpretation,
we think of each bandit selecting a sniping probability p as him choosing a pure
strategy from a continuous action space. This allows us to introduce probabilistic
sniping in situations where the expected utilities at the extremes (i.e. p = 0 or 1)
are not necessarily the same.
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Fig. 11 Interpretation of the sniping probability. Left: In the MZ paper, the pure actions available
to the bandit are sniping and not sniping. Mixed or (probabilistic) sniping is therefore only possible
when the bandit is indifferent between the pure actions. Right: In this paper, we interpret the
sniping probability as a pure but continuous action that the bandit can take. In this interpretation
the bandit need not be indifferent between the extremes in order to adopt a probabilistic strategy.
5.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria (SPE) in repeated games
5.2.1 The emergence of collaboration in repeated games
In the sections above we identified the risk aversion threshold γK above which
probabilistic sniping has the potential of yielding better utilities for both the market
maker and the bandits. When γ > γK there is a corresponding optimal sniping
probability p∗K that yields the most favourable outcome for all parties. The problem
with this strategy is that it does not constitute a Nash equilibrium for the single-
shot MZ1 game as bandits will be tempted to snipe more often than is allowed (see
section 3.4). However, things are different when we consider the infinite horizon
repeated game version (MZ∞). Indeed in this case, we can invoke the so-called
folk theorems that show that any equilibrium that is strictly better than a Nash
equilibrium in the single-shot (stage) game gives rise to a new Nash equilibrium
(NE) in the repeated game (at least, under the mild assumption that all the players
are sufficiently patient) [1].
However, for this to become a viable strategy we need to make the threat of
rescinding the cooperation implicit in probabilistic sniping, credible by devising a
method to detect non-compliance among the other agents. This is non-trivial since
even deceptive agents would still advertise spread s∗K , as spreads are publicly ob-
servable, and deviating from this would immediately flag their non-compliance and
trigger a collapse of the (implicit) agreement. Deceptive agents would therefore
stick to spread s∗K but snipe for sure, rather than with probability p
∗
K . However,
the sniping behaviour of agents is hidden to the other agents as it is not publicly
known who entered the race and who won it. An agent only has access to its own
utility (aggregated over many repetitions of the stage game). So each agent will
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have to base his decision (on whether or not to continue with the game) on the
impact that sniping by the deceptive agents has on his own utility.
5.2.2 Impact of deceptive sniping
When γK < γ < γL and all agents snipe with optimal probability p
∗
K they stand
to earn u∗K > 0 (on average). If, however, there are rogue agents that engage in
sniping at every possible occasion, then the utility for the trustworthy agents will
go down for two reasons:
1. as market makers they will suffer from more intense sniping;
2. as bandits they will have to race against an (on average) larger group of
competing bandits.
The combination of these two effects will affect their outcomes in various but
related ways: It will reduce the number of times they succeed in winning the race,
and this in turn will push down their aggregated utility.
This is illustrated in Fig. 12 where the blue error-bars show the average util-
ity (averaged over 10000 simulations of the stage game) when all agents snipe
probabilistically (with probability p∗K). These results are clearly consistent with
the theoretically predicted value u∗K = 0.015 (blue dotted line). However, things
change significantly when there is even a single devious agent (HFT 5 in the fig-
ure) that snipes for sure (red error-bars). The utility for this deceptive agent more
than doubles while the expected utility for the trustworthy agents (1 through 4)
dips below zero (u = −0.0016, red dotted line).
See:KPD_supplementary_material_game_simulations.ipynb (section 7.2)
Observing this unexpected downturn in utility an agent can suspect (some
of) the other agents are not complying, and consequently decide to renege on
his earlier commitment to the probabilistic sniping strategy. To turn this intuition
into a reliable operational strategy, we need to quantify the effect that deceptive
agents have on the expected utility of the trustworthy agents. This is taken up in
the next section.
5.3 Expected utility in the presence of deceptive agents
5.3.1 Generalising probabilities h(p) and g(p) when there are deceptive agents
To evaluate the expected utility of a specific trustworthy agent amidst deceptive
agents, we consider the case where the total of H agents is divided into Ht trust-
worthy agents (who stick to probabilistic sniping) and Hd deceptive agents who
pretend to restrict their sniping but in reality enter the sniping race at every possi-
ble occasion (obiously, Ht+Hd = H). We can now build on the earlier exposition
in section 3.3 where, in eqs. (25) and (30), we expressed the expected utilities
in terms of the probabilities h(p) and g(p). Closer inspection of these equations
shows that only these probability functions need to be modified in the presence of
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Fig. 12 Mean utility for agent group of Ht = 4 trustworthy agents (agents 1 through 4) and
Hd = 1 deceptive agent (agent 5). The mean and error-bars (±1 standard error) show the
results for a simulation of a large number of stage games, while the dotted lines indicate the
theoretically predicted value. When everyone adheres to probabilistic sniping, the mean is the
same for all agents. When the deceptive agent snipes for sure, the theoretical mean (dotted red
line) corresponds to the expected utility for the trustworthy agents (1 through 4). The deceptive
agent (agent 5) is clearly able to increase his gains at the expense of the trustworthy agents.
deceptive agents as the other factors only depend on the game parameters. We
therefore introduce the following notation which extends the probabilities h(p)
and g(p):
– htm(p,Ht, Hd) is the probability that a specific individual trustworthy agent,
who is acting as market maker, will lose the MZ-race given that the Hd
deceptive agents snipe for sure, while the remaining Ht−1 trustworthy agents
enter the sniping race with probability p (denoted as: wp. p):
htm(p,Ht, Hd) := P {MM will lose race | Hd agents snipe for sure, . . .
. . . while (Ht − 1) remaining trustworthy agents snipe w.p. p}(49)
In addition to the market maker, the number of agents in the race is Hd
(all the deceptive agents snipe for sure) plus a sample (of stochastic size
Nt ∼ Bin(Ht − 1, p)) of the remaining Ht − 1 trustworthy agents who snipe
with probability p. Hence:
htm(p,Ht, Hd) = E
(
Hd +Nt
1 +Hd +Nt
)
where Nt ∼ Bin(Ht − 1, p)
(50)
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– gtb(p,Ht, Hd) is the conditional probability that a specific trustworthy agent,
acting as bandit, wins the sniping race, given that he actually enters the race,
and Hd deceptive agents snipe for sure, while the remaining Ht−1 trustworthy
agents enter the race with probability p:
gtb(p,Ht, Hd) := P {agent will win race | he enters the race as bandit, . . .
. . .while the remaining Ht − 1 trustworthy agents snipe w.p. p, . . .
. . . and the Hd deceptive agents snipe for sure} (51)
A similar reasoning implies that gtb(p) is a weighted average of the following
two terms:
– if the market maker happens to be selected from the group of trustworthy
agents (probability (Ht− 1)/(H − 1)) then the list of agents in the race is
composed of: the agent under scrutiny, the market maker, all the deceptive
agents (Hd) and a random selection of the remaining Ht − 2 trustworthy
agents;
– if the market maker happens to be selected from the group of deceptive
agents (probability Hd/(H − 1)), the list of agents in the race comprises,
in addition to the trustworthy agent under scrutiny, the market maker, all
the remaining deceptive agents (Hd − 1), as well as a random selection
from the remaining Ht − 1 trustworthy agents.
Recasting this logic in mathematical parlance, we arrive at the following ex-
pression:
gtb(p,Ht, Hd) =
(
Ht − 1
H − 1
)
E
(
1
2 +Hd +N
(m)
t
)
+
(
Hd
H − 1
)
E
(
1
2 + (Hd − 1) +N (b)t
)
=
(
Ht − 1
H − 1
)
E
(
1
2 +Hd +N
(m)
t
)
+
(
Hd
H − 1
)
E
(
1
1 +Hd +N
(b)
t
)
where N
(m)
t ∼ Bin(Ht − 2; p) and N (b)t ∼ Bin(Ht − 1; p) (52)
(For the sake of completeness we add that the binomial random variables are
independent).
An alternative characterisation of gtb which, from a computational point of view,
is slightly more convenient is presented in appendix H.
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_2.ipynb (section.3)
5.3.2 Non-compliance detection based on sequential utility testing
Rather than basing the non-compliance test on the aggregated utility (which is
a rather crude measure), we monitor the rate of occurrence of each individual
utility outcome. To this end, we utilise the fact that since the game parameters
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are common knowledge, each agent can use Table 1 to compute the values of the
J = 9 different possible utilities. In addition, combining the event probabilities
in that table with the generalisation htm and gtb specified in eqs. (50) and (52),
he will be able to compute the corresponding probability of each utility outcome,
both under the assumption of compliance (Hd = 0) and non-compliance (Hd > 0).
These probabilities are listed in Table 2.
utility probability
0 1
H
{β(1− 2µ)(1− htm(p))}+ H−1H {1− βpgtb(p)(1− µ)}
−γ(2σ − s) αβ · ( 1
H
) · htm
s
(
1
H
) {αβhtm(p) + (1− β)(1− 2α− µ)}
−γ(σ − s) ( 1
H
) {α(1− β) + βhtm(p)(1− 2(α+ µ)) + βµ}
s+ σ
(
1
H
) {βµ(1− htm(p) + α(1− β)}
2s µ · ( 1
H
) {βhtm(p) + (1− β)}
2σ − s H−1
H
{αβpgtb(p)}
σ − s
(
H−1
H
)
· βpgtb(p) {1− 2α− µ}
−γs
(
H−1
H
)
· β
2
· αpgtb(p)
Table 2 Overview of unique utilities and corresponding probabilities (for a trustworthy agent).
So, in essence, we have a situation in which each stage game produces a
utility outcome uj (j = 1, 2, . . . , J) with a known probability distribution pi
0 =
(pi01 , . . . , pi
0
J) under the assumption of overall compliance (null-hypothesis of fair
behaviour with everyone sniping probabilistically at the optimal rate p∗K) and an
alternative known distribution pi1 = (pi11 , . . . , pi
1
J) that applies to a trustworthy
agent, assuming that there are a specific number Hd > 0 of deceptive agents that
snipe for sure (see Appendix J). This is illustrated in Fig 13 where we have plotted
the probability of occurrence of the nine possible outcomes under two different
regimes (with and without deceptive agents).
When, after stage game t, an individual trustworthy agent receives utility ut, he
can compute the likelihood of this outcome under the two alternative hypotheses
i.e. without (null hypothesis H0) or with (alternative hypothesis H1) deceptive
snipers, and determine which one is more likely:
P (ut | H0) ≤?? ≥ P (ut | H1)
For illustrative purposes we look at a concrete example,
See, KPD_supplementary_material_game_simulations.ipynb (section 9)
Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [21] provides a principled way
of aggregating the evidence collected over a sequence u1, u2, . . . , ut of utility
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Fig. 13 Probability distribution (taken from Table 2) for the finite set of utility outcomes under
two different regimes (BLUE: Fair (Hd = 0), RED: Hd = 1). Bottom: Same figure as above,
but probability of zero utility has been suppressed for reasons of clarity.
observations. More specifically, at every time (stage game) t we construct the
following test statistic:
S(t) =
t∑
τ=1
log
P (uτ | H1)
P (uτ | H0) . (53)
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To implement the sequential test procedure we first need to compute the following
two threshold values:
a := − log
(
1− α
β
)
b := log
(
1− β
α
)
(54)
where α is type I error (related to significance) and β is the type II error (related
to power). We then get the following stopping rule:
– if a < St < b: continue testing;
– if St < a: accept H0 (all HFTs are trustworthy)
– if St > b: accept H1 (i.e. reject H0, there is at least one devious HFT)
So, any trustworthy agent that is monitoring his accumulated utility will com-
pose the Wald test-statistic as follows: at time (stage game) τ he will receive utility
uj(τ). Once this result is known, he will compute the probability ratio pi
1
j(τ)/pi
0
j(τ)of
this event under both hypotheses (fair H0 and deceptive H1) and then sum the
logs of these ratios. He will then continue testing until hitting one of the two
thresholds in eq.(54), whereupon he can draw a statistically significant conclusion
regarding the compliance of the other agents. This is illustrated in Fig. 14 where
the top row shows the fate of a trustworthy agent in a group of three additional
agents one of which is cheating. The bottom row shows the fate of a trustwor-
thy agent when each of his three colleagues is honouring the implicit contract of
optimal probabilistic sniping.
See, KPD_supplementary_material_game_simulations.ipynb (section.10)
6 Related work
High-frequency trading Over the last decades, financial markets have changed sig-
nificantly and become fragmented. Hence, traders can search across many markets,
but this requires costly infrastructure and technology to make trading profitable
[8]. In addition, high speed trading is now considered to be a crucial part of the
trading technology. In 2010, the speed of round-trip between NASDAQ and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange decreased from over 14.5 milliseconds to under 8.1
milliseconds in 2014 [5]. Also NASDAQ supports high frequency traders by offering
faster access to their infrastructure and trade data transmission [13]. In response
to these drastic changes in financial markets, algorithmic trading harnesses ad-
vanced technologies to connect to different markets directly and trade ever faster
at lower costs. Therefore, high-frequency traders (HFTs) can trade continuously
and benefit from serial order processing. This continuous time trading has given
rise to a speed race and sniping has emerged as an opportunity for HFTs to benefit
from a stale quote [11]. In [2] it is shown that HFTs will tend to post thin but
strictly positive bid-ask spreads to compensate the costs of getting sniped even
without asymmetric information about fundamentals.
The emergence of high-speed trading has spurred on a lot of research regarding
the effects on important market parameters such as liquidity. The seminal paper by
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Fig. 14 TOP: Simulation results for a group of 4 agents, three of which are trustworthy and snipe
with optimal probability p∗K while one of them is deceptive and snipes for sure. The evolution of
the utility of one of the trustworthy agents during the repeated game is plotted on the right, and
the corresponding Wald SPRT statistic on the left. Around stage game 115 the Wald statistic
hits the upper limit (b in eq. 54) indicating that the null hypothesis of FAIR game can be
rejected. This would therefore be the moment the trustworthy agent would choose to quit the
game. BOTTOM: Same statistic and data but this time for a group of four agents that are all
abiding by implicit probabilistic sniping contract. In this case the Wald statistic hits the lower
limit (a in eq. 54) around stage game 175, allowing the agent to accept the null hypothesis of
FAIR game.
Menkveld and Zoican [16] has been the starting point for this research and has been
discussed extensively in this paper. The focus in both this and the MZ paper has
been on a stylized version of the interactions occurring at high frequency electronic
exchanges. However, real market are competitive and continuous, and algorithmic
traders need to choose their strategies from scratch and for a longer period in
order to benefit from the dynamic of the market and speed (arms race). Moreover,
traders should have a set of predefined strategies [6] and traders’ behaviour may
be influenced by observing their competitors [18]. Therefore, we explain agent’s
strategies and the reason why repeated game instead of one shot Nash equilibrium
is a better choice to explain behaviours in the electric exchange. The case for
repeated games is further strengthened by research by Bruce (2007) that shows
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that a one-shot stage game brings significant surplus loss to the traders in a
dynamic setting [4]. More recently, some studies showed that repetition in the
game allows decision makers (agents, players in the market) to construct their
strategies explicitly and benefit in the long-run [7,18].
Breitmoser(2015) analyzed individual strategies that are cooperate after mu-
tual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, otherwise randomize. He finds
a semi-grim equilibrium as a threshold that agents start cooperating in the first
round by knowing treatment parameters and switch to semi-Grim with equal prob-
ability in the repeated game. At the end, sustain mutual cooperation led to the
long-run welfare [3] and [10]. Furthermore, agents gain experience from the his-
tory of the game and trust is built [14] and an indefinitely repeated games with
high continuation probability helps agents to mix strategies with minimal restric-
tions on the type and lengths of pure strategies [18]. While repeated game helps
sustain cooperation, it is important to monitor the game in case of any defec-
tions. In 1947, Wald [21] develops a statistical test called Sequential probability
ratio test (SPRT) based on likelihood ratio. This test is applied repeatedly during
the sampling process and terminate whenever there is sufficient evidence in the
data for one of the hypotheses of interest. In this paper, we use SPRT to detect
non-compliance agent in different scenarios.
7 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we re-analysed the MZ game, a stylized version of a market interact-
ing with a high frequency exchange as originally described in [16], and argued that
a recasting of the problem in terms of repeated games offers a natural interpreta-
tion in which the solution space of equilibria accommodates genuine probabilistic
sniping. Probabilistic sniping was introduced in the original paper to account for
changes in the behavior of HFTs when risk aversion increases, but its practical sig-
nificance in the single-shot game is limited. However, in the context of repeated
games probabilistic sniping provides genuinely new and interesting insights. In par-
ticular:
– We outlined a simple geometric argument that allows one to deduce the general
conditions that govern the transitions in sniping behaviour. By translating
these conditions in terms of the risk aversion parameter γ we obtained two
new thresholds (γK and γL).
– Contrary to the situation in the single-shot game, we predict that probabilistic
sniping will start playing a role even before the equilibrium utility for sure
sniping is reduced to zero (by increasing risk aversion).
– We defined unfavourable scenario in which there are deceptive agents in the
game. In comparison with favorable (fair) situation, the presence of non-
compliant agents reduces trustworthy agent’s expected utility. We showed how
one can use Wald’s SPRT to monitor the sequential game and flag when the
utility for trustworthy agents deviates from the optimum point.
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Some notes on extensions for further research In both this paper and the original
MZ paper it was shown how simple and highly stylized models can already provide
unexpected insights and interesting conclusions. We therefore expect that more
realistic models will yield even more intriguing insights. Some of the challenges
we intend to tackle in an upcoming paper are:
– We showed how important quantities that determine the qualitative transitions
in the results (such as s∗K or γK) can be computed based on the knowledge of
the game parameters, i.e. α, µ, δ and H. However, in most realistic situations,
these parameters are unknown and need to be estimated from observations.
As a result there is an amount of uncertainty and noise associated with these
results. How stable are the conclusions with respect to noisy game parameters?
– In the repeated game scenario expounded in this paper, each stage game starts
from zero position. It can be modified to a more realistic strategy, as the traders
want to regress back to zero-positions.
– Risk aversion varies depending on position. One reason for this is that traders
dread reporting bad news. Hence, when they find themselves in a negative
position, they are willing to take more risk since, if they are lucky, they can
redeem themselves, and if they are unlucky, the ”size” of their bad news does
not make all that much difference.
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Appendix: Supplementary Material
A List of notation and abbreviations
MZ or MZ1 Menkveld-Zoican (single-shot) stage game
MZ∞ infinite horizon repeated MZ game
HFT High Frequency Trader, also called agent
LT Liquidity trader (operates in background by hitting available quotes)
MM or M market maker (selected from among the HFTs)
B or HFB (high frequency) bandit (all HFTs that were not selected as market maker)
H total number of HFT agents (H = Ht +Hd)
Ht total number of trustworthy agents (snipe probabilistically)
Hd total number of deceptive agents (snipe for sure)
v intrinsic value of a (financial) asset
s (half) spread (0 ≤ s ≤ σ), simply referred to as spread
p sniping probability
α arrival rate for news events (Poisson process)
σ jump size upon news
µ arrival rate for LT arrivals (Poisson process)
δ exchange latency (duration of MZ race)
γ risk aversion factor (γ > 1)
β probability that trigger (i.e. first) event is news: β = α/(α+ µ)
1− β probability that trigger (i.e. first) event is LT arrival: 1− β = µ/(α+ µ)
α (half) the expected number of news arrivals in interval [0, δ)
µ (half) the expected number of LT arrivals in interval [0, δ)
m 1− µ
θ harmonic mean of α and µ
s∗, u∗ spread and utility at point of indifference
s∗(p), u∗(p) same as above under probabilistic sniping
p∗K optimal sniping probability (maximises expected utility)
s∗K corresponding optimal spread s
∗
K = s
∗(p∗K)
γK γ-threshold for transition from sure to probabilistic sniping
γL γ-threshold for transition from probabilistic to no sniping
h(p) probability that market maker will lose race (when HFTs snipe wp. p
g(p) probability that bandit will win the race, given he enters race and all HFTs snipe wp. p
htm(p,Ht, Hd) h(p) for trustworthy market maker when there are Ht trustworthy and Hd devious HFTs
gtb(p,Ht, Hd) g(p) for trustworthy bandit when there are Ht trustworthy and Hd devious HFTs
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B Computer code
1. Simulation experiments:
KPD_supplementary_material_game_simulations.ipynb
2. Check the existence of the solutions:
KPD_supplementary_material_1.ipynb
3. Check the sniping probability properties and numerical test:
KPD_supplementary_material_2.ipynb
4. Check the numerical analysis:
KPD_supplementary_material_numeric.ipynb
C Details of payoff computation
The payoff for each agent is based on eq. (2) which we here restate:
payoff = position(t=δ) × value(t=δ) + income(t=δ)
This allows us to compute the payoff for each event-code. See table (3) and (4) for detailed
payoff and utility computation.
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Event codes Values at t = δ MM loses race MM wins race
when there is a race MM B MM B
NG-NG
Position = −1 +1 0 0
Value = 2σ 2σ 2σ 2σ
Income = s −s 0 0
payoff = −2σ + s 2σ − s 0 0
Utility = -γ(2σ − s) 2σ − s 0 0
NG-NB
Position = −1 +1 0 0
Value = 0 0 0 0
Income = s −s 0 0
payoff = 0 + s 0− s 0 0
Utility = s -γs 0 0
NG-LA
Position = −1 0 -1 0
Value = σ σ σ σ
Income = s 0 s 0
payoff = −(σ − s) 0 −(σ − s) 0
Utility = -γ(σ − s) 0 -γ(σ − s) 0
NG-LB
Position = 0 +1 +1 0
Value = σ σ σ σ
Income = 2s −s −(−s) 0
payoff = (0)(σ) + 2s σ − s σ + s 0
Utility = 2s σ − s σ + s 0
NG-no
Position = −1 +1 0 0
Value = σ σ σ σ
Income = s −s 0 0
payoff = −(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
Utility = -γ(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
NB-NG
Position = +1 −1 0 0
Value = 0 0 0 0
Income = s −s 0 0
payoff = 0 + s 0− s 0 0
Utility = s -γ s 0 0
NB-NB
Position = +1 −1 0 0
Value = 2σ 2σ 2σ 2σ
Income = s −2s 0 0
payoff = −2σ + s 2σ − s 0 0
Utility = -γ(2σ − s) 2σ − s 0 0
NB-LA
Position = 0 −1 −1 0
Value = -σ -σ -σ -σ
Income = 2s −s s 0
payoff = (0)(−σ) + 2s 0 σ + s 0
Utility = 2s σ − s σ + s 0
NB-LB
Position = +1 0 +1 0
Value = −σ −σ −σ −σ
Income = s 0 s 0
payoff = -σ + s 0 -σ + s 0
Utility = -γ(σ − s) 0 -γ(σ − s) 0
NB-no
Position = +1 −1 0 0
Value = -σ -σ -σ -σ
Income = −s s 0 0
payoff = -(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
Utility = -γ(σ − s) σ − s 0 0
Table 3 This table represents a list of possible events, when there is a race, from t = 0 to t = δ
with detailed computation of payoff and utility based on eq. (2)
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Event code No race Event code No race
MM B MM B
LA-NG
Position = −1 0
LB-NG
Position = +1 0
Value = σ σ Value = σ σ
Income = s 0 Income = s 0
payoff = -σ + s 0 payoff = σ + s 0
Utility = -γ(σ − s) 0 Utility = σ + s 0
LA-NB
Position = −1 0
LB-NB
Position = +1 0
Value = -σ -σ Value = -σ -σ
Income = s 0 Income = s 0
payoff = σ + s 0 payoff = -σ + s 0
Utility = σ + s 0 Utility = -γ(σ − s) 0
LA-LA
Position = −1 0
LB-LA
Position = +1 0
Value = 0 0 Value = 0 0
Income = s 0 Income = 2s 0
payoff = s 0 payoff = 2s 0
Utility = s 0 Utility = 2s 0
LA-LB
Position = 0 0
LB-LB
Position = +1 0
Value = 0 0 Value = 0 0
Income = 2s 0 Income = s 0
payoff = 2s 0 payoff = s 0
Utility = 2s 0 Utility = s 0
LA-no
Position = −1 0
LB-no
Position = +1 0
Value = 0 0 Value = 0 0
Income = s 0 Income = s 0
payoff = s 0 payoff = s 0
Utility = s 0 Utility = s 0
Table 4 This table represents a list of possible events, when there is no race, from t = 0 to
t = δ with detailed computation of payoff and utility based on eq. (2)
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D Expected utility for market maker and bandit
Expected utility for market maker To compute the expected value EUM we first
condition on the nature of the trigger event: news (prob = β) or LT arrival (prob = 1 − β).
Next, in case the trigger event is news, a race ensues, and we additionally condition on whether
(prob: 1 − h) or not (prob. h) the market maker wins. To streamline the notation we split an
eventcode e into the first and second event e = (e1, e2) (e.g. for e = LA-NG we have, e1 = LA
and e2 = NG. Referring to the probability tree in Fig. 15) we see that the probability of each
eventcode e can be decomposed as:
p(e) = p(e1)p(e2) =

(
β · 1
2
)
· p(e2) if e ∈ N***(
(1− β) · 1
2
)
· p(e2) if e ∈ L***
Hence, we get the following expansion in terms of possible event-codes e:
EUM (s) = β
 ∑
e∈N∗∗∗
p(e)uM (s | e)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trigger = News (race!)
+ (1− β)
 ∑
e∈L∗∗∗
p(e)uM (s | e)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trigger = LT (no race!)
= β
1
2
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uM (s | e)
 + (1− β)
1
2
∑
e1∈L∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uM (s | e)

=
β
2
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
[
p(e2)
{
h · uM (s | e&MM loses) + (1− h) · uM (s | e&MM wins)
}]
+
(1− β)
2
∑
e1∈L∗
∑
e2
{p(e2)uM (s | e)}
Based on the equation above, the following three sums need to be evaluated (using Table 1).
1. There is a race which MM loses:
S1 :=
1
2
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uM (s | e&MM loses)
=
1
2
[2α s(1− γ) − 2µ (γ(s− 1)− 2s) + 2 γ(s− 1))] (55)
2. There is a race which MM wins:
S2 :=
1
2
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uM (s | e2&MM wins) = 1
2
[2µ ((γ + 1)s− γ + 1)] (56)
3. No race:
S3 :=
1
2
∑
e1∈L∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uM (s | e) = 1
2
[2α (s (γ − 1) + 1− γ) + 2 s(µ+ 1)] (57)
Recombining we get:
EUM (s) = β (hS1 + (1− h)S2) + (1− β)S3
In addition, it is useful to compute the values at the endpoints (s = 0 and s = 1):
46 Kokabisaghi, Dorsman, Pauwels
C = EUM (s = 0) = βh(−γm) + (1− h)(−µ(γ − 1) + (1− β)(α(1− γ))
= βh(µq −mγ)− qθ
= βh(2µq + µ− q − 1)− qθ
D = EUM (s = 1) = −β(αhq +m) + (µ+ 1)
(58)
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.2.3)
Expected utility for bandit Since the bandit only gets utility when he wins the race, we
have to condition three events:
1. there is a race: prob = β
2. the bandit enters the race: prob = p
3. he wins the race (given that he entered): prob = g(p)
Using this information we can make the following factorisation:
EUB(s) = βpg(p)EUB(s | bandit enters and wins race) (59)
=
1
2
βpg(p)
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uB(s | e2& bandit wins race)
= βpg(p)S (60)
where we can use Table 1 to compute
S :=
1
2
∑
e1∈N∗
∑
e2
p(e2)uB(s | e& bandit wins) = α s(1− γ) + (µ(s− 1)− s+ 1) (61)
From this we get:
A := EUB(s = 0) = (1− µ)βpg(p) = mβpg(p)
B := EUB(s = 1) = −α(γ − 1)βpg(p) = −αq βpg(p)
(62)
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.2.1)
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Fig. 15 Schematic representation of the probabilities of the first and second event. Since these
two events are independent, the total probability of any event code is the product of two of these
probabilities.
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E Probability of sniping computation
E.1 Probability h(p)
Recall from eq.(15) that h(p) is defined as the probability that the market maker will lose the
race given that there is a race and all the bandits will attempt to snipe with probability p:
h(p) := P {MM will lose MZ race | individual bandits enter race with prob p}
It is conceptually easier to focus on the complementary probability h(p) := 1−h(p) that the
market maker will win the MZ-race and therefore thwart the sniping attempts of the bandits.
Specifically, since the H − 1 bandits decide independently and with equal probability p, whether
or not they will snipe, the number of bandits that will enter the race is a random variable (NB
say) that is distributed according to a binomial distribution:
NB ∼ Bin(H − 1, p).
This is equivalent to saying that the probability of having b = 0, 1, . . . , H−1 bandits participating
in a race, equals:
P (NB = b) =
(
H − 1
b
)
pb(1− p)H−1−b for b = 0, 1, . . . , H − 1 (63)
When there are b bandits racing, the probability that the market maker will win the race equals
1/(1 + b) since each participant has the same probability of winning. As a consequence, the
probability h(p) that market maker will win the race (and therefore escape sniping) equals
h(p) =
H−1∑
b=0
1
b+ 1
(
H − 1
b
)
pb (1− p)H−1−b (64)
which can be recast as:
h(p) = E
(
1
NB + 1
)
where NB ∼ Bin(H − 1, p). (65)
Computation of h(p) and h(p) To prove that eqs. (64) and (65) can be expanded to give
rise to
h(p) =
1− (1− p)H
pH
, (66)
we proceed as follows (we introduce n = H − 1 for notational convenience).
Recall that it is a straightforward consequence of the definition of binomial coefficients that:
(n+ 1
b+ 1
)
=
n+ 1
b+ 1
(n
b
)
whence
1
b+ 1
(n
b
)
=
1
n+ 1
(n+ 1
b+ 1
)
Substituting this in eq. (64) yields:
To snipe or not to snipe, that’s the question! 49
h(p) =
n∑
b=0
1
(b+ 1)
(n
b
)
pb(1− p)n−b
=
1
p(n+ 1)
n∑
b=0
(n+ 1
b+ 1
)
pb+1(1− p)(n+1)−(b+1)
=
1
p(n+ 1)
n+1∑
k=1
(n+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)(n+1)−k (subs: k = b+ 1)
=
1
p(n+ 1)
(
n+1∑
k=0
(n+ 1
k
)
pk(1− p)(n+1−k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−p0(1− p)n+1
)
=
1− (1− p)n+1
p(n+ 1)
=
1− (1− p)H
pH
(n = H − 1).
The computation above also implies that
h(p) = 1− h(p) = E
(
NB
1 +NB
)
=
(1− p)H − (1−Hp)
Hp
(67)
where NB ∼ Bin(H − 1, p).
Some special cases Notice that for sure sniping (i.e. p = 1) we get the familiar factor
h := h(1) = (H − 1)/H. Similarly, we can differentiate eq.(67) to obtain:
h′(p) =
1− (1− p)H−1(Hp+ 1− p)
Hp2
=⇒ h′(1) = 1
H
(68)
To investigate the behaviour for small values p ↓ 0 we use the standard binomial expansion:
(1− p)H = 1−Hp+ H(H − 1)
2
p2 − H(H − 1)(H − 2)
6
p3 + . . .
from which we conclude:
h(p) =
H − 1
2
p− (H − 1)(H − 2)
6
p2 + o(p3) as p→ 0. (69)
and therefore:
h(0) = 0 and h′(0) =
H − 1
2
. (70)
E.2 Probability g(p)
Recall eq.(19) and (20)
g(p) := P{individual bandit will win race | he participates in the race}
Since the market maker always races, and we condition on this bandit also being in the race, the
number of agents in the race equals 2 +NB where NB ∼ Bin(H − 2, p). Hence:
g(p) = E
(
1
2 +NB
)
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Using the binomial identity: (n+ 2
b+ 2
)
=
(n+ 2)(n+ 1)
(b+ 2)(b+ 1)
(n
b
)
a computation completely analogous to the one for h(p) shows that:
g(p) =
H−2∑
b=0
1
b+ 2
(H − 2
b
)
pb(1− p)H−2−b = (1− p)
H − (1− pH)
H(H − 1)p2 =
h(p)
(H − 1)p (71)
Special cases In the paper we need the following special cases:
– Limit for sure sniping p→ 1
g(1) =
h(1)
H − 1 =
1
H
(72)
and also:
g′(p) =
h′(p)p− h(p)
(H − 1)p2 =⇒ g
′(1) =
h′(1)− h(1)
H − 1 = −
H − 2
H(H − 1) (73)
– Limit for no sniping p→ 0 Using the expansion eq. 69 for h(p), we get a similar expansion
for g(p):
g(p) =
1
(H − 1)p
{
H − 1
2
p− (H − 1)(H − 2)
6
p2 + o(p3)
}
=
1
2
− H − 2
6
p+ o(p2) (74)
From this we can conclude:
g(0) =
1
2
and g′(0) = −H − 2
6
. (75)
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_2.ipynb
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F Proof of Proposition 1: Existence and uniqueness of γK
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the transition threshold γK we need to show that the
cubic polynomial (cf. eq. 45):
K(γ) = K3γ
3 +K2γ
2 +K1γ +K0
has a unique zero-crossing greater than 1. To this end we prove the following three steps (also
see Fig 16):
1. K3 < 0 indicating that limγ→∞K(γ) = −∞, i.e. K(γ) will be negative for sufficiently
large values of γ;
2. K(1) = K3 +K2 +K1 +K0 > 0. which in combination with K3 < 0, shows that there is
at least one zero-crossing greater than 1;
3. Finally, we show that K′′(1) = 6K3 + 2K2 < 0 which proves that the cubic polynomial is
concave to the right of γ = 1. This implies that the zero-crossing γK is in fact unique.
The detailed calculations that prove the three steps above can be found in the Python notebook:
See: KPD_Supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.5)
Fig. 16 The proof of the existence and uniqueness of the threshold γK is based on the following
three properties of the K(γ) cubic polynomial: (i) K3 < 0,K(1) > 0, and K is concave to the
right of 1.
G Proof of Proposition 2: Existence and uniqueness of γL
To prove that the transition threshold γL exists and is unique, we point out that (cf. eq. (42))
du∗(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=0
= 0 ⇐⇒ N ′(0) = 0.
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The right hand side can be expanded as a function of γ, or even more conveniently, as a function
of q = γ − 1. It turns out :
N ′(0) = −1
2
αβθq2 +
1
2
β(1− µ)(βµ− β + µ+ 1).
Computing the zero-crossings for the quadratic equation on the right hand side, we conclude
that there is a unique solution greater than 1, viz.:
γL = 1 +
√
(1− µ)Z
αθ
where Z = 1 + µ− β(1− µ).
This concludes the proof.
The detailed calculations that prove the three steps above can be found in the Python
notebook:
KPD_Supplementary_material_1.ipynb (section.6)
H Alternative computation of gtb
Let A be the stochastic variable representing the number of agents in the race. Denote by
M ∈ T (D) the event that the market maker is one of the trustworthy (T ), or deceptive (D)
agents, respectively. Then
A = (A | M ∈ T )P (M ∈ T ) + (A | M ∈ D)P (M ∈ D)
We can make the following decomposition:
– Since we condition on a specific trustworthy agent in the race, there are H − 1 agents left,
Ht − 1 of them are trustworthy.
– We can visualise the selection process as follows. Line up the agents. The first Ht are
trustworthy, the next Hd are the devious ones. Indicate who will race or not. Agent 1 will
race (we condition on this event), from the remaining Ht−1 trustworthy agent a stochastic
number Nt ∼ B(Ht − 1, p) will race, as well as all the devious ones. Then select a market
maker uniformly from agent 2 through H (we have conditioned on the first agent to race as
bandit).
– If the choice of market maker is among the devious ones, nothing changes in the list of
racing participants.
– If the choice of market maker is one of the Ht−1 remaining trustworthy agents there are
two possibilities. If the agent was already singled out for racing (prob = Nt/((Ht−1))),
nothing changes.
If however, the agent was not planning on racing (prob = (Ht − 1−Nt)/(Ht − 1)), he
will now do so and the number of racers is incremented by one to 1 +Nt +Hd + 1 =
2 +Nt +Hd. Combining these observations we get:(
Nt
Ht − 1
)(
1
1 +Nt +Hd
)
+
(
Ht − 1−Nt
Ht − 1
)(
1
2 +Nt +Hd
)
or again:
1
(Ht − 1)
{
Nt
1 +Nt +Hd
+
Ht − 1−Nt
2 +Nt +Hd
}
– P (M ∈ T ) = (Ht−1)/(H−1) the market maker is chosen among the remaining trustworthy
– P (M ∈ D) = Hd/(H − 1)
Combining all these together we get the following alternative for eq.(52):
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gtb(p) =
(
1
H − 1
)
E
{
Nt
1 +Nt +Hd
+
Ht − 1−Nt
2 +Nt +Hd
}
+
(
Hd
H − 1
)
E
{
1
1 +Nt +Hd
}
=
(
1
H − 1
)
E
{
Nt
1 +Nt +Hd
+
Ht − 1−Nt
2 +Nt +Hd
+
Hd
1 +Nt +Hd
}
(76)
where Nt ∼ Bin(Ht − 1, p).
This characterisation of gtb has the advantage that it involves only a single random variable,
which makes sense whenever Ht ≥ 1. The original characterisation in eq. (52) — although
conceptually simpler — involves two binomial random variables and requires Ht ≥ 2 to be
well-defined..
See: KPD_supplementary_material_2.ipynb
I Change in mean utility due to deceptive agents
We are now in a position to combine all these results and write down the equivalents for eqs. (25)
and (30). More specifically, if a trustworthy agent acts as bandit, his utility is a linear function
determined by the endpoints:
Atb(p,Ht, Hd) = mβp gtb(p,Ht, Hd)
Btb(p,Ht, Hd) = −α(γ − 1)βp gtb(p,Ht, Hd)
Ctm(p,Ht, Hd) = −
{
qθ + β(mγ − µq)htm(p,Ht, Hd)
}
Dtm(p,Ht, Hd) = (1 + µ)− β {m+ αq htm(p,Ht, Hd)}
(77)
To evaluate for a given spread the expected utility ut(s) of a trustworthy HFT one simply needs
to evaluate the expected utilities in both roles (bandit and market maker):
utb(s) = Atb(1− s) +Btb s and utm(s) = Ctm(1− s) +Dtm s
which can then be combined (assuming that all agents advertise the same spread s and therefore
have equal probability of being selected as market maker):
ut(s) =
1
H
utm(s) +
H − 1
H
utb(s) (78)
See.KPD_supplementary_material_numeric.ipynb (section.6)
J Probability distribution of unique utilities
In general, there are only 9 unique utilities (see table 1). This is still the case in the presence of
deceptive agents since even deceptive agents will publish the optimal spread. We can compute
the probability with which these occur explicitly. Notice that there are three different cases:
1. Utilities that occur only for MM (−γ(2σ − s), s,−γ(σ − s), 2s, σ + s)
2. Utilities that occur only for bandit (2σ − s,−γs, σ − s)
3. Zero utility that occurs for both market maker and bandit
Let’s do so for some concrete cases:
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– Utility 2σ − s for successful sniper (example of utility that occurs only for bandit): this
utility occurs twice (NG-NG and NB-NB + MM loses race to successful sniper). To compute
the probability we need to multiply the probability of each row ((1/2)αβ) with that of the
column and add it all together. Since the column is the same for both events (let’s denote
it as pcol we get:
p{2σ − s} = αβ · pcol
where
pcol = P (agent get this utility | he’s bandit)P (he’s bandit)
+P (agent get this utility | he’s MM)P (he’s MM)
= P (agent get this utility | he’s bandit)((H − 1)/H)
+0 · (1/H)
=
(H − 1)
H
P (agent get this utility | he’s bandit)
The last probability can be expanded further:
P (agent get this utility | he’s bandit)
= P (agent enters race and wins | he’s bandit)
= P (agent enters race | he’s bandit) · P (agent wins race | he’s bandit and enters race)
= p gtb(p)
where we need to use gtb since we are only interested in the fate of trustworthy agents.
Combining both results we see that
P{2σ − s} = αβ ·
(
H − 1
H
)
p gtb(p)
– Utility σ− s for successful sniper this utility occurs 4 times when there is NG-NO, NB-NO
and MM loses the race,and NG-LB and NB-LA and bandit benefits from the news arrival
(MM loses the race in the news side) .
In all cases, the probability that successful sniper (bandit) enters the race (H − 1)/H and
win the race is p gtb(p) (As we explained in detail in the utility P{2σ − s}).
In the case of NG-NO and NB-NO, the row probability is the same for both
events.Combining with column probability (bandit is selected
(
H−1
H
)
and is the race winner
p gtb(p)):
probNG−No,NB−No = β · (1− 2(α+ µ)) ·
(
H − 1
H
)
p gtb(p)
and the same for NG-LB, NB-LA:
probNG−LB,NB−LA = β · µ ·
(
H − 1
H
)
p gtb(p)
The total probability of getting the utility (σ − s):
P{σ − s} = β ·
(
H − 1
H
)
p gtb(p) · (1− 2α− µ)
– Utility −γs for successful sniper The only two events that produces this utility are NG-NB
and NB-NG for a successful sniper (event probability in each case αβ/2 ). In this case, the
trustworthy agent acts as a bandit (prob: (H − 1)/H), he enters the race (prob: p) and
wins (prob: gtb(p)). However, he doesn’t benefit from it (make loss) as additional bad news
decreases the intrinsic value. Combining all this yields:
P{−γs} = αβ
(
H − 1
H
)
p gtb(p)
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– Utility s for market maker. This utility occurs on six occasions: NG-NB, NB-NG, LA-
LA, LA-no, LB-LB and LB-no. For each of these cells in the table we can compute the
probability by multiplying the probability of the row and the column. For the last four, the
column probability is that of being market maker (1/H). Adding the probabilities of the
rows yields:
(1/2)(1− β) · 2 · (µ+ 1− 2(α+ µ)) = (1− β)(1− 2α− µ)
Hence the total probability of the last four cells equals:
probLA−LA,LA−No,LB−LB,LB−No =
1
H
(1− β)(1− 2α− µ)
To complete the computation we need to compute the probability of the first two cells. Only
the probability of the column needs attention. It requires being selected as MM (prob =
1/H) but losing the race htm(p). Hence the combined total probability of these two cells
equals:
probNG−NB,NB−NG = 2 · (1/2)αβ ·
(
1
H
)
htm(p) =
(
1
H
)
αβhtm(p).
Combining the two results we get the following total probability for the utility s:
P{s} =
(
1
H
)
[αβhtm(p) + (1− β)(1− 2α− µ)]
– Utility −γ(σ − s) for market maker.
This utility occurs when there is: NG-LA, NB-LB, LA-NG, LB-NB, NG-No, and NB-No. The
column probability for all cases is that of being selected as a market maker (1/H). Adding
the probabilities of events in the rows, we see :
Probability for NG-LA and NB-LB:
In these events, MM wins and loses the race, so this utility happens four times and htm
cancels out!.
probNG−LA =
(
1
H
)
2 · β
2
· µ · htm +
(
1
H
)
2 · β
2
· µ · (1− htm)
Therefor :
probNG−LA =
(
1
H
)
· β
2
· µ
It is the same for NB-LB and combining two events:
probNG−LA,NB−LB =
(
1
H
)
· β · µ
Probability for NG-No and NB-No + MM loses the race with probability htm(p): In
both events, MM loses the race as bandit hits the stale quote:
probNG−No,NB−No =
(
1
H
)
2 · β
2
· (1− 2(α+ µ)) · htm(p)
Probability for LA-NG and LB-NB (The utility in these events happens four times):
probLA−NG,LB−NB =
(
1
H
)
(1− β) · α
Combining probabilities of six events:
P{−γ(σ − s)} =
(
1
H
)
{α(1− β) + βhtm(1− 2α− 2µ) + βµ}
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– Utility s+σ for market maker. There are four corresponding events for this utility: NG-LB,
NB-LA, LA-NB and LB-NG.
To compute the probability:
To compute row probabilities for the first two events (NG-LB and NB-LA), we need
to multiply the probability of each row:
probNG−LB,NB−LA = µβ
probLA−NB,LB−NG = α(1− β)
Then, to compute the column probability, we need the probability of( 1
H
) MM being selected
and (1− htm(p)) for winning the race (for NG-LB and NB-LA) hence the total probability
for this utility equals :
P{s+ σ} =
(
1
H
)
{βµ(1− htm(p)) + α(1− β)}
– Utility 2s for market maker This utility befalls the market maker in four events : NG-LB,
NB-LA, LA-LB and LB-LA.
Row probability for NG-LB and NB-LA + MM loses the race:
µβ
Adding 1/H the probability of being selected as MM and losing the race htm yields:
probNG−LB,NB−LA = µβ ·
(
1
H
)
· htm
Row probability for LA-LB and LB-LA:
probLA−LB,LB−LA = µ(1− β) ·
(
1
H
)
Adding the probabilities of events in the rows, we see :
P{2s} = µ
(
1
H
)
(β · htm(p) + (1− β))
– Utility −γ(2σ − s) for market maker. this utility occurs in events: NG-NG and NB-NB.
Adding row probability with column probability that is MM being selected ( 1/H ) and
loses the race htm yields:
P{−γ(2σ − s)} = αβ ·
(
1
H
)
· htm
– Zero utility P{0} for bandit
This utility occurs in all events when the first trigger event is the arrival of LT. In these
events, bandit has no chance of winning the race. Also, this utility occurs whenever bandit
loses the race, either MM wins the race or the arrival of LT.
LA-LA, LA-LB, LB-LA, LB-LB:
µ(1− β)(2)
(
H − 1
H
)
LA-NG, LA-NB, LB-NG, LB-NB:
α(1− β)(2)
(
H − 1
H
)
LA-No and LB-No :
(1− 2(α+ µ))(1− β)
(
H − 1
H
)
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NG-LA, NB-LB (bandit lose and win the race) :
bandit loses the race :
PNG−LA = µβ
(
H − 1
H
)
· p(1− gtb)
bandit wins the race :
PNG−LA = µβ
(
H − 1
H
)
· p(gtb)
Therefore:
PNG−LA = µβ/2
(
H − 1
H
)
the same for NB-LB:
PNB−LB = µβ/2
(
H − 1
H
)
combining four events:
PNB−LB = µβ
(
H − 1
H
)
When bandit loses the race in all other events if the first trigger event is news.
(events = NG-LB,NB-LA,NG-NG,NG-No,NB-No,NB-NG,NB-NB)
Pevents =
(
H − 1
H
)
β(1− pgtb)(1− µ)
Total probability for P{0} is:
P{0}bandit =
(
H − 1
H
)
(1− β + βµ+ β(1− pgtb)(1− µ))
This can further be simplified to:
P{0}bandit =
(
H − 1
H
)
(1− βpgtb(1− µ))
– Zero utility P{0} for MM
e1 = NG-NG, NG-NB, NB-NG,NB-NB:
Pe1 =
(
1
H
)
2βα(1− htm)
e2 = NG-No, NB-No:
Pe2 =
(
1
H
)
β(1− 2(α+ µ))(1− htm)
Therefore :
P{0}MM =
(
1
H
)
β(1− htm)(1− 2µ)
Alternative derivation
PB{u = 0} := Prob that trustworthy bandit receives zero utility (u = 0)
PB{u = 0} = PB(u = 0 | race)P (race) + PB(u = 0 | no race)P (no race)
= PB(u = 0 | race) · β + 1 · (1− β) (79)
PB(u = 0 | race) = PB(u = 0 | race and B enters race )P (B enters race | race) (80)
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utility probability
0 1
H
{β(1− 2µ)(1− htm(p))}+ H−1H {1− βpgtb(p)(1− µ)}
−γ(2σ − s) αβ · ( 1
H
) · htm
s
(
1
H
) {αβhtm(p) + (1− β)(1− 2α− µ)}
−γ(σ − s) ( 1
H
) {α(1− β) + βhtm(p)(1− 2(α+ µ)) + βµ}
s+ σ
(
1
H
) {βµ(1− htm(p) + α(1− β)}
2s µ · ( 1
H
) {βhtm(p) + (1− β)}
2σ − s H−1
H
{αβpgtb(p)}
σ − s
(
H−1
H
)
· βpgtb(p) {1− 2α− µ}
−γs
(
H−1
H
)
· β
2
· αpgtb(p)
Table 5 Overview of unique utilities and corresponding probabilities.
